It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable, writes the Greek historian Thucydides in his famous History of the Peloponnesian War. War between a rising China and a fearful United States may not be inevitable, not least due to nuclear weapons. Security competition will be impossible to avoid.
While settling a significant number of land border claims, China has been pursuing a more assertive foreign policy with regards to maritime claims in the East and South China Sea. In response, the Obama administration decided to “pivot” to Asia. Militarily, Washington seeks to deploy 60% of all naval assets to Asia by 2020. Diplomatically, it is seeking to build closer with countries that are odds with Beijing. Economically, it is pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in order to strengthen its foothold in, and demonstrate its commitment to, its actual and potential allies. Japan, meanwhile, has begun to raise defence expenditure and decided to join TPP negotiations. Tokyo is similarly also pursuing a more activist regional diplomacy in an attempt to counter China’s growing weight.
Competing territorial claims are at the proximate cause of recent regional tensions. Nationalism, historical grievances, arcane legal arguments and natural resources all play a role. Ultimately, however, the quest for security is the structural cause that drives growing competition. Beijing seeks to create greater strategic depth. By claiming the area within the so-called nine-dash line, virtually the entire South China Sea, China seeks to turn the seas into territorial waters, thereby excluding foreign navies as well as creating a forward base from which to project naval power beyond the so-called First Island Chain (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines). China does not want the US navy freely roaming its “near seas”. Ultimately time, China wants to project naval power beyond the Second Island chain (Japan, Marianas, Guam) in order to be able to protect its sea lines of communication instead of continuing to depend exclusively on the US navy for protection. If successful, this would greatly strengthen Beijing’s position vis-à-vis its neighbours, including Taiwan.
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| Source: DoD |
Having evolved from an autarkic to a highly integrated economy since the late seventies, China’s economic prosperity and political stability today depend on external trade and, in particular, access to commodity supplies. China is the world’s largest consumer and importer of many commodities and largely relies on seaborne trade. Sixty per cent of Chinese crude oil imports, for instance, pass through the Strait of Malacca, a figure that is bound to rise further in coming years. It is therefore no surprise that Beijing seeks to use its growing economic power and military capabilities to manage this potential vulnerability. One of way to achieve this is expand its zone of influence and control.
What China is doing is what rising powers do. Wilhelmine Germany, unsuccessfully, sought to build a navy to challenge the Royal Navy. A rising United States, not being in a position to expel the European powers from the Americas, sought to prevent their further expansion in the Americas (Monroe Doctrine), before being able to take a more assertive stance (Spanish-American War). Similarly, Beijing is claiming much of the East and South China Sea and it is complaining about the US military presence in the region. Its growing military capabilities are perceived as a potential threat by the US and, especially, other countries in the region that have competing territorial claims.
Security competition in the region is very unlikely to go away. For a start, Japan is even more dependent on energy imports than China. So any Chinese gain is a Japanese loss in terms of security. The second- and third-largest economies in the world are locked into a zero-sum game. Leaving aside historically conflictual relations, it is difficult to see how there will be co-operation rather than competition or even conflict. Moreover, great powers typically seek to face down challengers. They do not simply pack in and abandon the field. Washington is therefore not going to withdraw from the world’s most dynamic economic region without putting up resistance. The pivot is proves as much.
Security competition has the potential to be destabilising. However, geo-political competition can coexist with prosperity, economic growth, international trade and investment. Economic interdependence may or may not act as a check on outright conflict. It certainly does not prevent competition and, if push comes to shove, not even armed conflict. (Ask Norman Angell.) Barring a major accident, a broader and full-blown military conflict in East Asia is unlikely. The economic costs would be tremendous and, more importantly, nuclear powers, for good reason, tend to be more circumspect about going to war with one another.
Continued competition will drive solid growth in defence expenditure throughout the region. Japan will regard economic revitalisation as crucial if it is to keep up with the competition. Japan’s arms industry will benefit from increasing government expenditure and greater sales, supported by the government, to Japan’s partners in the region. Japan will also direct a greater amount of investment and offer more financing to actual and potential allies in the region in order to mitigate potential China-related supply chain risks and to build stronger relations with actual and potential allies. For similar strategic reasons, Japan is also going to join TPP, in spite of domestic opposition.
China will continue to diversify its commodity imports, seeking to mitigate its dependence on maritime trade (Silk Road, Central Asia, Russia), while strengthening its naval capabilities. Beijing will also seek to raise energy efficiency. Beijing will seek to build closer diplomatic, economic and financial relations within the region and beyond (e.g. string of pearls countries, Pacific Islands, Africa), offering investment and financing.
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| Source: NPR |
Last but not least, Washington will remain strongly engaged, diplomatically, economically and politically, current diversions in the Middle East notwithstanding. TPP is just one example of how the US tries to counter growing Chinese influence. US engagement will also translate into more investment, more trade and greater economic benefits for some of the smaller countries (e.g. Philippines, Vietnam). The US will also sell more arms to the regions, benefitting the US defence industry.
The point is this. Many future economic, financial and political trends in the region will be, if not determined, heavily influenced by the continued security competition between a rising China and a status quo defending United States and its regional allies.