German unification following the Franco-German war brought about major change in the geo-political situation of Europe. Forward-looking statesmen at the time understood the implications of a unified Germany. As British Prime Minister Benjamin Disrali put it as early as 1871:
"This war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than the French revolution of last century […] Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity incident to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions in this House about the balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed the ship of State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve an equilibrium in Europe. [ . . . ] But what has really come to pass? The balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England" (February 9, 1871).
Bismarck recognised that any further increase in power would risk jeopardising Germany’s position and security. This why Bismarck sought to keep the other European powers at loggerhears, while making Germany "indispensable" (Kissinger Diktat). Germany sought to play the "honest broker" in order to avoid the cauchemar des coalitions and especially a possible two-front. Bismarck’s insistence of Germany being a “saturated power” has the same goal. Bismarck was acutely aware of Germany’s difficult geo-political position. His successors would not or perhaps could follow the principles laid out in the Kissinger Diktat.
The structural stress on the European state system already present during Bismarck’s reign increased significantly thereafter. Bismarck’s complicated alliance system became more difficult to manage. After his departure in 1890, Germany abandoned Bismarck’s foreign policy principles and began to pursue a more assertive foreign policy as most famously articulated by von Bülow’s place in the sun speech (1897). Its economic and demographic rise made it an even more formidable actor, potentially capable of establishing complete continental hegemony. This is certainly what other European powers feared and this is how some observers in Germany saw it. However, German policy-makers were equally concerned about encirclement, especially following the rapprochement between France and Russia and later between France and Britain. For a long time, Berlin thought it impossible for Britain and Russia to join up given their antagonism in India. Berlin was similarly confident that a British-French entente was impossible given that the two powers’ colonial competition. In part due to its rise (and the fear it inspired, as Thucydides would say), in part due to its inept diplomacy, Germany found itself in exactly the sort of diplomatic position, Bismarck knew Germany had to avoid at all costs. The lapsing of the so-called re-assurance treaty between Germany and Russia in 1890 set Germany on the wrong path, ultimately leading to World War II.
Structurally speaking, Germany after 1871 found itself in a potentially even more precarious position than Prussia. Territorial consolidation had removed potential buffer zones, transforming the European state system, first, into a zero-sum game and, secondly, into a more tightly coupled system. The other European powers feared the destruction of the existing balance-of-power by an economically and militarily ever more powerful hegemonic Germany, while Germany feared encirclement. Europe was characterised by a typical security dilemma (Jervis 1978). European great power politics was increasingly perceived as a zero-sum game. In the end, this made each state more sensitive to even small shifts in the intra-European distribution of power. It also left less slack and redundancy to absorb shocks, making the system more sensitive to misperceptions and policy mistakes. The system over time moved towards a ‘critical state’ during the early 20th century. In part this was also due to a tightening and more inflexible alliance system and changing military technology. The latter favored the "cult of the offensive" (van Evera 1994) and ultimately led to a "war by timetable" (Taylor 1969).
 |
| Mittellage 1914 |
When 1914 came, European and German policy-makers rather than sleepwalking into a general war were arguably prepared to a take a calculated risk (Clarke 2014; Copeland 2000), indeed, more than often than not, felt they had no choice but to take the risk. While different individuals and bureaucracies might have held slightly differing views, the structural drivers of the leap towards war help explain why the war broke out. True, structure may not explain why the war broke out in 1914 rather than 1912 or 1913 (Schroeder 2004), but it helps understand the costs and benefits countries and decision-makers faced at the time.
The rise of Russia’s military power on the back of rapid industrialization caused concerns among Germany’s political and military elite. Fritz Fischer (1961) has plausibly if not necessarily convincingly argued that Germany plunged into World War, seizing the opportunity offered by the Austro-Hungarian/ Serbian-Russian tensions, in order to pre-empt Russia’s rise. This sounds eerily familiar to the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941. Germany’s military planners naturally failed in not providing the political leadership with options. To be fair, it was German diplomacy that led Germany to its precarious geo-political position. The Schlieffen Plan basically gave Berlin only one high-risk military option to fight a two-front war. The problem of course was this was premised on the unstated assumption that Germany would not be able to improve its position in the near to medium future. Due to repeated diplomatic blunders and a complete strategic failure, Germany ended up being/ perceiving itself to be “encircled”. The balance-of-power was shifting against Germany and the central powers and military victory and political hegemony began to be seen as the only solution. As a strategy and policy, it was a very risk strategy and it failed disastrously.
Similarly, France and Russia were worried about abandonment. Either country was individually insufficiently powerful to go to war with Germany. Anything other than an unconditional backing of the other would have meant the risk of losing their most important alliance partner and security guarantee. If necessary, this was worth risking a general war for.
Military planners, unlike diplomats, may be have been forgiven to prepare contingency plans for a two-front war. The Schlieffen plan was meant to fight and win a two-front war against both France and Russia. Recognising Germany’s inability to fight and win a war of attrition, victory was to be achieved in just a few months. The Schlieffen Plan seemed to offer a, albeit high risk, military option to redress Germany’s weakening diplomatic position and eroding economic-military preponderance in continental Europe. Repeated diplomatic blunders and a complete failure of strategic thinking led Germany to perceive itself to be the victim of geo-political “encirclement”. Whatever the archival record, it is plausible that Germany perceiving the situation as unsustainable over the medium term abandoned balance-of-power policies and ‘went for’ hegemony. Certainly, both the Bethmann-Hollweg war aims and the German-Russian armistice can be interpreted in this vein. The punitive peace settlement of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 and the desire to gain control over Belgium can be understood along similar lines. The German military in its quest for absolute security. Quite rightly, the allies saw this as an attempt to impose German hegemony on continental Europe – something utterly unacceptable to France, Britain as well as the United States. The long-standing focus on narrowly military issues while neglecting broader political and strategic objectives.
The military logic would have pushed Germany towards complete regional hegemony. Bismarck had realized that the other great powers would not be willing to accept a further expansion of German power, lest it would lead to complete German hegemony. Further expansion would therefore prove ultimately self-defeating. This is why the iron chancellor sought to promote Germany’s image as a ‘satisfied power’ and an ‘honest broker”. While Germany was capable of defeating any one power in Europe (with the exception of Britain), it would not be strong enough to overcome an alliance of great powers. The inability to prevent the emergence of just such an alliance was the great failure of German diplomacy. Britain had a long-standing policy of preventing the emergence of a single dominant power on the continent. The very same objective mobilized the United States during both WWI and WWII to enter the war on the allies’ side. Whether or not Germany invaded Belgium, violating its neutrality, Britain would have found it difficult to stay out of the conflict for good, old-fashioned strategic reasons. Curiously, Nazi German found itself in a comparable situation following the defeat of France. Yet Britain decided to fight on.
Military logic beat political-diplomatic logic (Iklé 1972). Only a defeat of both France and Germany and massive territorial annexations would guarantee the future security of the German empire. Militarily this may have been true, but it also made any peace based on German objectives utterly unacceptable to the other European powers. FDR's support for the Britain before the US entry into the war was the logical consequence of Germany's plunge towards European hegemony. Had the German military been successful in 1914, the US would very likely have pursued the same policy it did adopt in 1939-40.
Geo-strategically, the situation in the early 1930s was different. Germany had accepted the territorial losses in the West. It did not give up its claims to recover its Eastern territories. Germany’s opposition to the Versailles Treaty may appear to have made way for Weimar Germany’s acceptance of the order, at least in the West. Faced with weaker potential opponents, Germany never accepted its losses in the east. In the west it was not powerful enough to take on France, militarily at least. Germany, having been stripped of its army, had no hope of recovering its territorial looses in the west. Within the realm of geopolitical possibility, Weimar Germany did seek to change the status quo post bellum wherever possible.
Nazi German foreign policies points towards continuity in important respects (Dehio [1955] 1959). The first foreign policy moves were aimed at destroying the post-1918 European order and make Germany more powerful and more secure. Granted, Nazi Germany once again sought to establish hegemony in Europe. The change in political regime in Berlin in the early 1930s, combined with the breakdown of the world economic and financial system, demonstrated Germany’s geo-political and geo-economic vulnerability. It sought to achieve economic autarky and political-military hegemony.
Once again, Germany came close to achieving it. After brining Western European under its control, it failed to subdue the USSR. Faced with replay of the two-front war, it fought the USSR in the East and Great Britain in the West – both backed by the United States. London had no interest in seeing Germany control the European continent. Neither had Washington an interest in seeing Britain fall to Germany, potentially over the medium-term allowing German naval power to be projected deep into the Atlantic. Hence Roosevelt’s very early efforts to lend support to Britain, requiring him to circumvent an anti-war Congress. Germany, economically and military incapable of sustaining a war of attrition against two or three “flanking powers”, was defeated after a long and brutal conflict.
The end of WWII saw the emergence of a bipolar European and global international system. This transformed the European state system from a multi-polar into a bi-polar one, dominated by extra- or partially extra-European powers. Germany lost more territories and eventually was divided into two separate states, economically, politically and militarily integrated into two antagonistic blocs. The original German problem had disappeared.
The post-war settlement saw the loss of further territories in the East, the division of Germany into two separate states, economically, politically and militarily integrated into two antagonistic blocs. Germany ceased to be a subject of European international politics and largely become the object of it. The expulsion was driven by the objective of not giving Germany a pretext for territorial aggrandizement. It also reflected Russian/ Soviet desire to create a larger buffer and greater strategic depth, even if the Warsaw Pact took of that, too. In this sense centuries of German eastward cultural and economic expansion was reversed and with the emergence of two political blocs, West Germany was largely cut off from Eastern Europe. Extra-European powers, the United States and the USSR ended multi-polarity and divided up the continent and Germany.
Under US leadership, Germany was gradually integrated into the Western alliance: militarily, in the guise of NATO; economically, in the guise of the European Community and the post-Cold-War EU. Under this regime, Germany began its long path to political (and moral) rehabilitation as well as economic and political preponderance.
The end of the Cold, the break-up of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the loss of the Soviet and Russian position in Central Europe led to a major reshuffling of cards. The demise of Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe put the victorious United States and West Germany in the proverbial geo-political driver seat. In spite of concerns in London and Paris, Bonn with Washington’s backing was able to achieve the re-unification of the two Germanys under the effective leadership of the economically and politically victorious West German state, backed by US military, economic and political power. A politically and economically weakened Soviet Union (later Russian Federation) pulled out of Eastern Europe and later acquiesced to several rounds of westward NATO expansion, a policy strongly supported by a unified Germany.
 |
| NATO member (blue) |
Wither post-war geo-political order? Until the 2016 US presidential elections, this post-Cold War regime proved very stable from Germany’s vantage point. Russia’s Ukraine intervention did reflect greater Russian assertiveness and a modest resurgence, but did not fundamentally challenge NATO. Washington let Berlin and Paris take the lead on this issue, but the stability of NATO was not called into doubt. Germany’s 'immediate' security concerns have been solved. Germany finds itself in a peaceful, stable environment as far as its 'near abroad' is concerned. Challenges were lurking further afield, including non-conventional security risks (e.g. terrorism, migration). Germany was successfully focused on pursuing its economic interests. The change of tune is forcing Germany to re-think its policies. It remains to be seen if current US policies are an aberration or the beginning of a broader geo-strategic shift.
As Russia was pushed back, the EU and NATO and Germany were able to make inroads. Russian geo-political imperatives are also quite constant, regardless of the existing regime. Russia was not in a position to push back for a number of reasons. First, the local populations were firmly in favour of joining the EU and NATO. Second, Russia’s economic, financial and military position was very weak following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It defaulted in 1998. Only the upswing in oil prices during the past decade allowed Russia to recover and strengthen its economic-financial position. This allowed to modernise its armed forces. Thirdly, Ukraine directly borders in Russia, has a large Russian and/ or pro-Russian population and it is seen as much more strategically important and of course much large in terms of territory, population and natural resources than any of the other Eastern European countries, including Poland. Moscow felt sufficiently strong undermine the Ukraine and turn the situation into a frozen conflict. Moscow probably realises that is not in a position to win Ukraine back, but it can at least prevent it from orbiting into Western sphere of influence. Russia was less well placed to influence Balkan states from seeking EU and NATO membership.
The elimination of one Flügelmacht and the persistence and expansion of NATO made Germany feel more secure and made possible the expansion of the EU, including the common markets, eastwards to include much of Eastern Europe, except former Soviet Republics and some relatively insignificant Balkan countries. Serbia is the largest country in the Balkans with a population of only 7m.
NATO was meant to “keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the boys in”. Its continued existence meant that Germany did not have to worry too much about its security. This has potentially change and certainly would change, should the US seriously weaken NATO. The geo-political situation risks becoming more fluid following Russia’s greater assertiveness in Ukraine and increased tensions between Russia and NATO. This has already led to a re-thinking in Germany’s about its military posture and further European military integration following Brexit and the change of tone in Washington.
Germany’s geographic position is both a risk and an opportunity depending on adept Germany diplomacy is. Of course, geography is not the all-determining factor. Wise diplomacy can succeed in keeping Germany out of an encirclement and avoid a potential two-front war. It can overcome security challenges turn is central position into an economic opportunity by taking advantage of lower cost labour and exporting to wealthier Western European economies.
Geography matters. So does diplomacy and power politics. So geo-politics matters. Germany bid for hegemony twice in the 20th century. The geo-political constellation in the 21st century is far more favourable from the German point of view than at any piont during its recent history. It is surrounded by military alliance partners. It is allied with the world’s most powerful country. The only significant conventional military threat may stem from Russia. Existing military alliance provides re-assurance.
Whether geography returns will depend on the geo-politics. The Northern European Plain remains a geographic fact. Its importance depends on the broader political constellation, military technology and the costs and benefits of using military force. A fracturing of European political and economic integration or of NATO would risk catapulting Germany back into its central position. It is therefore in Germany’s utmost strategic interest to maintain the present structure or, if this turns out to be too difficult or too costly, to replace it with something functionally equivalent. Stability requires (largely) the maintenance of the status quo.