Thursday, January 26, 2023

The Politics and Economics of the Debt Ceiling (2023)

The failure to raise the US debt ceiling in a timely manner will increase economic and financial uncertainty, raising the specter of a US debt default. After registering a deficit of $ 1.4 trillion in fiscal year 2022, the U.S. federal government has now reached the debt ceiling, which establishes the maximum amount of debt the federal government is allowed to issue. After reaching the ceiling on January 19, the Treasury began to take so-called “extraordinary measures”, which will enable it to keep debt below the ceiling until early June, depending on the evolution of Q1/ Q2 tax receipts. These extraordinary measures include the sale of existing investments and the suspension of reinvestments of various government-related pension funds, such as the Exchange Stabilization Fund, as well as the suspension of the agency’s issuance of State and Local Government Series Treasury securities. As far as the June estimate is concerned, the Treasury is likely to err on the side of caution so that a more likely date for the Treasury to run out of money will be the end of Q3. But as June approaches, market nervousness will increase, particularly if a political compromise on raising the ceiling continues to look out of reach, as this will increase the risk of a US debt default.

The politics of raising the debt ceiling will prove challenging, increasing the risk of potentially severe financial instability. A failure to raise the debt ceiling means that the government will lose the ability to raise funding to finance its ongoing fiscal deficits and ultimately to service its debt and other non-financial obligations, leading to a financial default and a significant decline in domestic spending and economic growth. In the coming months, the political debate in the U.S. will center around ways to raise the debt ceiling and prevent the federal government from running out of money to service federal debt. Politically, the standoff between Republicans in the House and the White House over the debt ceiling will be more difficult to resolve than in the past. House Republicans demand significant spending cuts in exchange for lifting the debt ceiling, but the White House has already made it clear it will not accept any conditions related to raising the debt ceiling. Some Republican senators back across-the-board spending cuts (incl. Cuts to the military budget). Aside from the ongoing political stalemate in Washington, the recent election of a much weakened speaker of the House of Representatives as well as continued concerns about the functioning of the treasury markets have increased risk further. The speaker of the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, was forced to make significant concessions to the Freedom Caucus and right-wing conservatives in order to be elected. This will make raising the debt ceiling more difficult. As will the fact that the marginal, right-wing Republican House member has a greater electoral incentive to demand spending cuts and risk a default than incentives to cave in the face of the Biden administration’s refusal to negotiate. To make things worse, financially, the political process will unfold in the context of increasing interest rates and Fed quantitative tightening and the ensuing concerns about increased financial stability risks (sale of treasuries and agencies by the Fed) as well as heightened concerns about financial stability and the fragility of the US treasury market, which seized up twice in the past five years. The politics of raising the debt ceiling are challenging and a debt default is at least within the realm of possibility. 


Politically, raising the debt ceiling will be messy. McCarthy was forced to offer three seats on the House Rules Committee to freedom-caucus or very conservative leaning members of his delegation. The committee is hugely important, as it decides what legislation advances to the House floor, what structure a debate takes and what amendments are admissible. If the three conservatives on the committee join up with Democrats, they can effectively block bills from reaching the floor. (There are nine Republicans and four Democrats on the Committee). And the three individuals that McCarthy appointed do have a history of holding up important legislation. Moreover, McCarthy had to agree to a change of rules that makes it easier to unseat the speaker, weakening his ability to keep Republicans in line and push through legislation. Moreover, the Republican majority in the House is very small, making its harder for the speaker to credibly commit to a compromise, should there be such a thing. There are congressional maneuvers that might allow centrists on both sides of the aisle to get around the House Rules Committee, such as the so-called “discharge petition”. But this is typically a lengthy and complicated process and may come too late in the midst of a fast-approaching financial meltdown. More speculatively, right-wing House Republicans will look at the 2011 standoff, which led the Obama White House to agree to spending cuts, and conclude that playing hardball may succeed, while the White House may view the 2011 compromise as a mistake. President BIden was the VP then. This would lead to a game of chicken, where the political logic leads to a major economic accident. 

The Treasury may decide to take legally doubtful actions to avert a default once it exhausts extraordinary measures. If Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling and the Treasury runs out of extraordinary measures, it may resort to emergency measures to prevent a default. First, once it has run out of sufficient cash to meet all its payments, the Treasury could seek to prioritize principal and interest payments, while withholding other mandatory payments, such as social security, public sector salaries etc. Such a move would encounter serious legal and administrative challenges. It would also do little to calm markets unless it were seen by investors as buying enough time to settle the debt ceiling dispute. Second, the Treasury could try to mint a USD 1 trillion coin, deposit it with the Treasury, and ask the Treasury to use it to pay government obligations, or so it has been suggested. This would be legally doubtful to say the least. Some legal scholars have suggested that the 14th amendment, which states that “(t)he validity of the public debt of the United States authorized by law (....) shall not be questioned”, may provide a legal basis for the Treasury to simply ignore the debt ceiling altogether. All these executive maneuvers are legally highly doubtful and uncertain and they would be subject to court challenges. In practice, such measures would be seen by financial markets as smacking of desperation and might yet fail to stave off a financial crisis and concomitant economic downturn.


If there is a technical default, the Federal Reserve has various options to limit the fallout. First, to counter the risk of a broader destabilization of the financial system, the Fed could take supervisory and regulatory action allowing banks to count defaulted debt toward their capital requirements, be lenient toward banks that experience a temporary drop of their regularly capital ratios as well as direct banks to give leeway to distressed customers in order not to exacerbate the likely credit squeeze. Second, the Federal Reserve could simply buy defaulted debt (limiting the direct impact of a default on the financial soundness of financial institutions, in particular), lend against defaulted debt and/ or enter into repo transactions with banks and selected non-financial institutions (esp. money market funds) to limit the fallout in terms of financial losses and defaults. However, This may not help stave off a systemic meltdown and much will depend on whether markets believe that a default will be remedied quickly as well as how likely investors believe that such legally questionable intervention will survive legal challenges.


A US debt default risks pushing financial markets into a potentially major crisis and the economy into recession. Missing a payment on US government debt would lead to a sharp increase in risk aversion in US and global financial markets and a selloff of risk assets, such as equities, high-yield corporate debt and leveraged loans, and it might lead to a significant reduction in bank lending and credit in the economy. Similarly, a decision to stop non-financial payments would represent a major drag on economic demand, lead to increased risk aversion and also lead to sharply increased financial market volatility. Again, it is unclear what the exact market reaction would be in such a scenario. If markets believe that following a missed payment and Fed intervention to backstop the market Congress will come to its senses, a major destabilization may be avoided. If no end to the political standoff is in sight, markets may go haywire. Paradoxically, in both scenarios, it is quite possible that risk assets and equities sell off dramatically, but treasuries continue to benefit from strong demand, for lack of other global safe haven assets. 

The failure to raise the debt ceiling would potentially trigger a deep economic recession and severe financial market instability. It would force a USD 1.5 tr worth of spending cuts this year and a total cumulative of USD 14 trillion over the next decade, according to the Congressional Budget Office. (The federal budget for next year is USD 1.7 trillion!) Leaving aside the financial implications of a debt default, such a massive reduction in spending would push the economy into a major recession. Some estimates have the output loss at minus 5% and job losses at 3 million. But these are at best mechanical guesstimates. In reality, the range of potential financial and economic outcomes is huge, but includes a major destabilization not just of US, but also of global financial markets. Longer-term, a US default, even if quickly remedied, would certainly boost the longer-term prospects of other international currencies, including the euro and the yuan.

Wednesday, January 18, 2023

How To Devise a Coherent and Cohesive National Economic Security Strategy (2023)

Identify and quantify critical cross-border economic vulnerabilities.

> Pursue reforms to mitigate the most critical economic vulnerabilities. Risk mitigation policies should focus on reducing both economic vulnerability and concomitant political coercibility, while taking into account the relevant tradeoffs in terms of cost-effectiveness.

Devise a credible and effective deterrence policy to manage the economic security dilemma, consisting of vulnerability mitigation policies to facilitate ‘deterrence by denial’ as well as credible and effective retaliatory policy to facilitate ‘deterrence by punishment.’ Deterrence policies should (1) be well-calibrated in terms of the potential aggressor’s politically most salient economic vulnerabilities, (2) be sustainable in domestic economic and political terms (endurance), (3) be sufficiently robust in the face of possible escalation (retaliation and counter-retaliation), (4) be designed as a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’ (incl. automaticity and severity of response), and (5) be very explicit what type of unfriendly actions are considered potential escalation thresholds that substantially increase the risk of retaliation. Taken together, this should help make deterrence credible and effective, while avoiding an ‘escalating commitment trap.’ (If deterrence is not viable, then strategy should focus on mitigation policies.)

Create a system of collective economic security, consisting of military allies (and allies of allies?), whereby economic aggression against one is considered an attack against all, committing members to coordinated retaliation and/ or mutual assistance.

Integrate economic security policies with the soon-to-be-released national security strategy, ensuring that they are credible, effective, strategically coherent (not haphazard), integrated (across trade and finance) and appropriately calibrated (in terms of costs and benefits) in each case/ country/ scenario. A coherent economic security policy needs to reduce vulnerabilities (defensive/ securitization) and strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence and retaliation policies (offensive/ retaliatory/ weaponization).



GEO-EOCNOMIC VULNERABILITIES

MITIGATION POLICIES 

DETERRENCE & RETALIATION POLICIES

BENEFITS & DRAWBACKS OF MITIGATION POLICIES

POLICY INSTRUMENTS

- National Level

- Intra-EU

- Transatlantic/ International

Exports => 

vulnerable to import restrictions

 

-Reduces exports and economic growth

Identify export dependence in terms of value-added

 

Support export diversificationthrough (1) FTAs, (2) ‘targeted,’ export promotion, (3) ‘guided’ investment guarantees

 

(Create sufficient fiscal space to mitigate short-term impact of trade restrictions)

 

Leverage size of EU market

 

Threaten quasi-automatic (proportional or disproportional) retaliatory import restrictions, (if balance of power allows (targeting politically sensitive sectors in aggressor country)

 

Benefits: Limits export dependence (relative to baseline)

 

Drawbacks: FTAs may be trade-diverting

 

Even large number of free-trade agreements  will fail to offset significantly reduced market access in case of very large countries (e.g. China)

Delegate deterrence and retaliation policies to EU Commission (subject to clearly defined, pre-determined parameters)

 

 

Further develop ‘trade defence’ policies (incl. anti-coercion tool)

 

Develop policy instruments allowing for horizontal escalation (or non-trade retaliatory measures)

 

Set up intra-EU compensation mechanism to limit members’ incentives to ‘entrap’ EU in ‘unprovoked’ trade conflict

 

Create defensive, collective economic security alliance, committing individual members to coordinated deterrence and retaliation policies (and avoid ‘third-party spoiling’ behavior)

 

Adopt a policy of ‘extended  economic deterrence’ 

 

 

 

Imports => vulnerable to export restrictions

 

- Limits access to critical goods, disrupting vital supply chains

Identify critical import dependencies 

 

Reduce critical import dependence through (1) import diversification (incl. FTAs), (2) domestic production, (3) creation of emergency stockpiles

 

 

Leverage ability to withhold critical exports

 

Threaten automatic (proportional or disproportional) retaliation, (if balance of power allows (targeting politically and / or economically sensitive sectors)

 

Evaluate the viability of secondary sanctions to deter third-party spoilers

 

Calibrated  policy should combine various mitigation options, depending on desired economic cost/ risk reduction tradeoff/ risk tolerance

 

Benefits

Reduces dependence on ‘critical’ supplier

 

Drawbacks: Parallel, alternative supply chains raise costs; onshoring is generally even more costly

 

Review export control policies  in context of national security strategy

 

Coordinate/ integrate export control policy with inward/ outward foreign direct investment screening

Enhance intra-EU coordination/ integration of export control policies to make threat of retaliatory export restrictions more credible and effective 

 

Create EU buyers’ cartel and set up a common EU fund to finance emergency stockpiles of critical goods, providing quota-based access to in case of emergency

Create collective economic security alliance, committing members to coordinate deterrence and retaliation policies 

 

Set up intra-alliance ‘insurance scheme’ to provide mutual assistance in terms of critical goods in case of severe supply disruptions

 

 

Inward foreign direct investment => technological leakage

 

-  Gives acquirer ability ‘lock up’ or transfer cutting-edge technology, undermining national technological leadership and future innovation potential

 

- Puts at risk national security (incl. foreign ownership of critical infrastructure; other critical, especially defense-related economic sectors)

 

Identify ‘critical and foundational technologies’ relevant to future economic competitiveness and other national-security-related vulnerabilities

 

Screen inward foreign direct investment (and other investment allowing for technology leakage, like JVs)

 

Focus screening countries deemed to be (1) ‘non-market’ economies and (2) non-allies

 

Leverage position as provider of advanced technology

 

Threaten to restrict ability to invest/ acquire assets in specific sectors

 

Demand reciprocity or equivalent access to sender country’s respective high tech sectors to create a level playing field

 

 

 

 

 

Benefits

Mitigates (‘non-market-driven,’ politically driven)  technological leakage and safeguards protects national security

 

Drawbacks: Economic losses due to (1) reduced levels of investment, (2) reduced strategic partnerships (esp. high tech)

 

 

Review existing legislation in light of new national security strategy and appropriate definition of critical (future) technologies

 

Optimize policies to achieve desired risk reduction/ economic costs tradeoff

 

Explore if domestic legislation regulating foreign investor behavior can function as a substitute for outright investment restrictions (esp. critical infrastructure)

 

Enhance intra-EU coordination/ integration of inward FDI screening mechanism to make threat of restrictions more credible and effective (and prevent third-party spoilers)

 

Create EU-level equivalent of America’s CFIUS to monitor uniform implementation of converging rules

 

Strengthen EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation in terms of economic cost/ security benefits (including in JV and PE space)

 

 

Coordinate inward screening policies in order to facilitate transatlantic/ intra-alliance investment, technology sharing, diffusion and development

Outward foreign direct investment => vulnerable to ‘forced’ technological transfer

 

- Risk of technological leakage (e.g. forced transfers, IPR theft and  espionage)

 

- Risk of discriminatory, treatment 

(e.g. regulatory, counter-sanction measures, expropriation)

 

Identify ‘critical and foundational technologies’ and national-security-related vulnerabilities

 

Establish outward FDI screening  mechanism with a special focus on

(1) countries lacking sufficient legal safeguards, ( (2) non-allies (“countries of concern”)

 

Support FDI diversification through (1) investment guarantees/ subsidies, (2) BITs

 

(Put in place effective safeguards (more applicable in case of critical infrastructure than technology))

 

Leverage position of provider of technology goods 

 

Threaten to restrict further outbound investment and/ or force divestment 

 

 

 

 

Benefits

Reduces risk of forced’ technology transfer and time-inconsistent behavior of companies

 

Drawbacks: Economic losses due to  more limited access to overseas markets in terms of asset-, market- and efficiency-seeking investment

 

Does not really address espionage & IPR theft

 

 

Create (narrowly focused) outward investment screening mechanism

 

Make use of investment guarantees to ‘guide’ and diversify outward FDI

Establish intra-EU coordination and streamlining (esp. with respect to critical technologies)

Coordinate outward screening policies to ensure continued, relatively unfettered mutual, intra-alliance market access in terms of advanced technology

Outward non-FDI investment => vulnerable to financial sanctions

 

- Risk of asset freezes, expropriation

 

-Prohibition to buy/ sell designated financial assets (incl. access to currency)

 

 

Make mandatory disclosure of country risk related economic and financial exposure for relevant companies to encourage market monitoring 

 

Threaten (proportional or disproportional) financial retaliation (sanctions), such as (1) limiting/ prohibiting access to EU financial markets (incl. euro), (2) freeze existing assets, (3) assess cost/ benefits/ viability of secondary sanctions

Benefits

Creates incentives to manage country risk more actively, potentially reducing risk of excessive political-risk-driven financial losses

 

Drawbacks: Foregone investment opportunities and financial profits

 

Measures may be insufficient to alter firm behavior (esp. in case of large markets like China)

 

Put in place coherent financial counter-sanction policies

Delegate more authority to EU Commission (incl. Anti-Coercion Tool)

 

Establish fully-fledged EU sanctions agency to monitor effective enforcement

 

Lower EU majority requirements and establish intra-EU compensation mechanism to distribute costs of sanction measures more equally 

 

Structurally, strengthen euro architecture, including capital market integration

 

Collective economic security to strengthen credibility and effectiveness of deterrence and retaliation (and avoid ‘third-party spoiling’ behavior)