The DPRK under Kim III has intensified efforts to develop long-range nuclear missiles. The DPRK is committed to becoming an official nuclear weapons state under the 2012 constitution, a commitment it reaffirmed very recently at the party congress. Internationally, the DPRK today rejects the goal of denuclearisation agreed upon during the six-party talks in 2005. Obtaining long-range nuclear weapons helps strengthen Kim III’s domestic political position. Internationally, it helps increase the DPRK’s deterrence potential, given the DPRK’s increasing conventional inferiority. It might also create a future bargaining chip. The present programme is the continuation of the so-called military first policy. The DPRK will be extremely reluctant to agree to anything resembling denuclearisation, but it might be more willing to trade away its long- range missile programme in exchange for a peace treaty. It will refuse to trade away its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang seeks a long-range nuclear capability as a means to deter US military aggression. The DPRK has stated repeatedly that it would only use nuclear weapons if attacked. While US intelligence officials believe that Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons only “under very narrow circumstances” (James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), the next US president is unlikely to set much store by DPRK declarations, if only out of domestic political considerations.
Under Kim III’s leadership, Pyongyang has stepped up efforts to develop inter- continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and miniaturised nuclear war heads as well as SLBMs. The DPRK claims to have successfully tested an engine designed for ICBMs. It has successfully launched a missile into space. It claims to have developed and tested a miniaturised nuclear warhead. US intelligence and military officials have publicly said that they believed that the DPRK was capable of miniaturising a nuclear weapons and putting it on missiles (General Scaparrotti, commander of USFK). Uncertainty nonetheless exists as regards the reliability of miniaturised nuclear warheads and the range and accuracy of its long-range missiles. Several long-range missile flight tests have failed and the DPRK would require re-entry vehicles to make ICBMs effective. It is clear though that the DPRK is making intense efforts to develop nuclear-capable ICMBs of a sufficient range to reach the continental United States. US intelligence sources estimate that it will take the DPRK 2-3 years to master the necessary technology to build such a capability. Naturally, such predictions are inherently difficult to make with much confidence. What matters though is that the US government is working with this timeline in terms of its policy towards the DPRK.
If left unchecked, the DPRK will eventually build and field nuclear-capable ICBMs. Some US defence officials sound reasonably confident that they will be able to deal with a limited number of ICBMs launched against the US. Washington has an operational missile defence system in place allowing it to destroy a limited number of incoming intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles in space. But the reliability of the missiles defence system is less than a 100%. Washington would not want to run the risk of becoming the target of nuclear extortion by a so-called rogue state, however irrational such a policy might appear to be and however unlikely that might be. US diplomacy towards DPRK
The Obama administration has largely been pursuing a policy of strategic patience towards the DPRK. The next US president will be under heavy pressure to prevent the DPRK from developing nuclear-capable ICBMs. Anxiety in Washington is already rising. After all, Iraq’s WMD programme was an important driver of US policy - even if somewhat less important than claimed at the time. Even if deterrence is a workable policy, US domestic political dynamics will make it difficult for the next US president not to take increasingly forceful action to prevent the DPRK from developing ICMBs. The rogue state narrative combined with opaque and non-collegial DPRK decision-making structure will leave the US president with no choice but to resort to more forceful, coercive diplomacy. Recent statements by Hillary Clinton also support this view. Washington has already begun to tighten sanctions, multilaterally and bilaterally.
At the multilateral level, UNSC Resolution 2270 (March 2016) took sanctions to a new level with (1) mandatory cargo inspections of all North Korean ships, (2) sanctions on trade in natural resources and (3) sanctions targeting DPRK banks and assets. At the bilateral level, Washington adopted a new measure (Section 312 of the Patriot Act) that cuts off (Chinese) banks’ access to the US banks if they do business with the DPRK banks linked to the nuclear or missile programme. Washington has also helped the ROK to upgrade its military capabilities (e.g. F-35 fighters) and Seoul has just approved the deployment of the THAAD missile defence system. The economic, financial, military and diplomatic pressure on the DPRK is already being ratcheted up. Regional diplomatic backdrop
The regional diplomatic context matters in terms what future scenarios will look like. China, historically a key ally of the DPRK, is in a difficult position. Relations between DPRK and the PRC have worsened since Kim III’s ascension. Beijing is not pleased with its neighbour’s nuclear missile programme, not least because it risks upsetting the strategic balance in North-East Asia. Pyongyang’s stepped-up missile development and nuclear test efforts have put strain on PRC-ROK relations and is indirectly responsible for the deployment of THAAD system that Beijing fears is aimed at its own strategic forces. Even so, China remains reluctant to push the DPRK too hard in terms of sanctions in order not trigger a regime collapse. A collapse might not only cause a humanitarian crisis.
More importantly, it would also risk causing strategic instability in the region, possibly leading to the emergence of a united Korea allied to the US. Current DPRK policies are pushing Seoul into a closer relationship with Washington and it is also pulling Washington further into North-East Asia, undermining Beijing’s strategic position and slowing its ascendancy. But for an Iran-style approach to work, Washington will need to obtain the co-operation of Beijing. This being very difficult, but not impossible, to achieve, Washington may resort to or threaten to use military force against the DPRK.
North-East Asia is a large and critical part of the global economy as far economic size, trade and FDI are concerned. Geo-political instability, let alone a regional military confrontation, might lead to a severe disruption of the global supply chains running through the region. This would have very adverse global financial and economic consequences. The severity would depend on the type, length and intensity of a military confrontation.
Scenario 1 - Status quo => Gradual tightening of sanctions & slow DPRK technological progress
The DPRK continues to face significant obstacles in developing operational nuclear-capable ICBMs. Washington with some support from Beijing continues to tighten sanctions. Diplomatically things do not come to a head within the next 2-3 years. The DPRK economy is being squeezed, but not to the point of economic-political collapse. Wider economic and financial impact is negligible. This scenario remains the most likely scenario over the next 2-3, given the likely difficulties the DPRK’s missile programme will encounter. Even if it manages to master the technology, it needs to get to the stage of reliably deploying ICBMs in sufficient quantities in order for Washington to opt for scenario 3 (see below). Scenario 2 also looks less likely for reasons spelled out below.
Scenario 2 - Iran-style sanctions successful => DPRK curtails its ICBM programme
DPRK continues with stepped-up nuclear missile development efforts, prompting Washington to step up bilateral and multilateral sanctions very aggressively. Washington also succeeds in persuading Beijing that it is in its interest to prevent the DPRK from acquiring operational ICBMs by joining the US-led stepped-up sanctions regime, perhaps in exchange for concessions in other areas, perhaps because Beijing fears a significant strengthening of the US-Japanese-Korea alliance. A combination of Iran-style sanctions, after some back and forth, persuades the DPRK to fold for fear of an economic and regime collapse and to put on hold its missile programme in exchange for sanction relief and perhaps some sort of multilateral/ bilateral security guarantee/ peace treaty.
The question is how likely the DPRK would be to make such concessions. China is unlikely to push Pyongyang so hard as to trigger a collapse. Pyongyang knows this. If a military first policy prevails, this scenario will not materialise because Washington is highly unlikely to reward the DPRK with a peace treaty as long as the latter remains a de facto nuclear weapons state. If Iran-style sanctions prove successful, the international economic and financial impact will be limited, even if the path leading up to such an agreement could see increased diplomatic and military tensions on the peninsula.
Scenario 3 – DPRK fields a significant number of nuclear-capable ICBMs => US airstrikes
During the 1994-95 stand-off over the DPRK’s nuclear programme, the Clinton administration considered air strikes against DPRK nuclear sites. This is clearly a high-risk, last-resort type policy. It is complicated by the fact that two major US allies could suffer significant collateral damage if Pyongyang retaliated (ROK, Japan). It would deeply upset Beijing and it may turn out to be not very effective in terms of preventing the DPRK from acquiring a long-range nuclear capability. The economic, political and financial consequences would be severe and could have several difficult-to-predict second-round effects (e.g. Sino-US relations, DPRK military retaliation against US and US- allied targets in the region). However, should DPRK capabilities become a significant threat to US security and China fails to help rein in the DPRK, this scenario would become more likely over time/ by the end of the decade. After all, the threat from long-range nuclear missiles to US security is significantly greater than the DPRK’s nuclear programme in the nineties.
All things considered, scenario 1 looks more likely than scenario 2 over a 2-3 year horizon. How quickly the DPRK makes progress towards nuclear ICBMs will be the most important scenario driver. US missile defence capabilities and the limited amount of missiles the DPRK will be able to field at the very beginning will buy time and will make a military escalation less imminent than otherwise. But if scenario 1 falls by the wayside because the DPRK deploys long-range nuclear missiles and a diplomatic solution remains out of reach due to diverging US, Chinese and DPRK interests, then scenario 3 will become significantly more likely over time.