A rising China is seeking to revise the status quo in maritime North East and South East Asia, while all other major countries in the region are eager to preserve it. Since the global financial crisis in 2008-09, China has pursued a significantly more assertive foreign policy, especially with regards to the East and South China Sea. The perception of US weakness following setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq has encouraged Beijing to strengthen its position in the region. China claims large parts of the East and South China Sea and has sought to back these claims by building up a number of hitherto uninhabited islands and reefs, by more aggressive civilian/ non-civilian naval deployments, by fielding sophisticated military hardware and, in the case of the East China Sea, by establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This has fuelled increasingly terse disputes with many of its neighbours, especially Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Control of its near seas and access to the high seas as well as natural resources and nationalism underpin, to varying degrees, China’s more assertive stance. China is highly dependent on international trade, especially energy and increasingly food imports. By claiming the area within the so-called nine-dash line as territorial waters, China not only seeks to establish ownership of the natural resources within in it but also to gain the right to deploy military forces there in an attempt to establish effective control of the area. Strategically, China seeks to bring the seas within the first island chain under its control, before pushing more aggressively beyond it. In the mind of Chinese strategists, this represents only the first step towards safeguarding sea lines of communication and Chinese overseas interests more broadly, in addition to pushing out China’s defence perimeter. The One Belt One Road initiative similarly needs to be seen in terms Beijing’s concern over access to overseas markets. US “pivot” is meant to preserve the regional status quo.
The United States is committed to defending the territorial and political status quo. Washington is concerned about the region potentially falling under the control of an increasingly assertive China at the expense of US interests and influence. Ensuring access to Asian markets and preventing a dominant power from controlling East and South East Asia have been enduring US interests for more than a century. Even if Washington wanted to (and it does not), it would found it difficult to make concessions to a rising China as far as the regional status quo is concerned, lest it risks losing some of its actual and potential allies. From a longer-term perspective, China is also seen as a future potential peer competitor globally and Washington is unlikely to simply vacate the field - few declining great powers have done so historically – not least because the pre- conditions for maintaining the status quo are not too bad: most countries in the region are themselves eager for the status quo to be preserved. Most of them are similarly concerned about a rising, more assertive and revisionist China.
In the security realm, Washington is committed to the defence of its treaty allies and effectively opposes China’s attempt to change the territorial status quo. Washington expressed support for the recent The Hague UNCLOS ruling in favour of the Philippines and continues to insist on the principle of freedom of navigation. Strategically, the Obama administration announced the so-called “pivot to Asia”. The aim is to move 60% of US naval assets to the Pacific, up from 50% today. The US air force seeks to achieve the same distribution of forces. Washington has also acquired new basing and access rights or expanded existing rights in recent years (Australia, Philippines and Singapore). It has opened up Myanmar in order to counter Chinese influence there. It has revised US-Japanese defence guidelines giving the Japanese military greater leeway to support US military operations. It has sold and/ or is about to deploy advanced weapons systems to allies (e.g. F-25, THAAD in South Korea). It has lifted the Vietnam arms embargo. In operational terms, the Pentagon has been developing a so-called Air Sea Battle concept to counter China’s mostly land-based A2/D2 capabilities within the first island chain. All this adds up to a policy that seeks to counter-balance China’s increasing military prowess and political attempts to revise the post-WWII territorial and maritime status quo.
In the economic sphere, Washington is pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This “21st century trade agreement”, involving economic and financial that go far beyond the trade of goods, is meant to tie actual and potential US allies closer to the US economically, thereby strengthening countries in the region economically and creating common economic interests that will help complement intensifying security cooperation. In fact, the US is the economy that will benefit the least economically, suggesting that the primary purpose of TPP is indeed geo-political. After all, while Beijing recently expressed its interest in joining TPP after initially criticising the proposal heavily (and pursuing its own trade agenda with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Framework, a more traditional trade agreement), several features of the agreement have clearly been designed to prevent China from joining (e.g. SOE treatment). A more generous interpretation would be that Washington seeks to build institutions that ensure stability, lock in the commitment of other countries, guarantee US interests and prevent China from imposing its own economic regime in the region, including rules that might be potentially detrimental to US interests. (Whether TPP will get passed is another question entirely.) Again, Washington pursues a broader strategy aimed at countering rising Chinese power by defending the territorial status quo while at the same time seeking closer economic ties with the region.
“Trump risk” notwithstanding, Washington is highly unlikely to withdraw from the region or let down its allies. While Washington would be loath to be pulled into an armed conflict on the back of excessively provocative behaviour by its allies, it will be equally loath to risk letting East and South East Asia fall under Chinese domination. As long as the US remains committed to the region, China’s more assertive policies will only help to push countries in the region closer to Washington: countries will seek to balance China (with US support) rather than bandwagon. Washington will rely on the existing hub-and-spokes model in the region and it will cooperate and coordinate very closely with its two most important allies in the region: Japan and Korea.
Major regional powers also eager to preserve the status quo Japan feels the most threatened by China’s rise due to geo-political and historical reasons. Like China, Japan is heavily dependent on overseas trade and especially commodity imports. Territorial disputes surrounding the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands in the East China have intensified. Japan has no treaty allies except the United States. The alliance with the US is considered absolutely vital by Tokyo, but policy-makers are worried whether Washington would really be willing to fight a war with China rather than abandon Tokyo if push came to shove. Last but not least, historical issues related to WWII and wide-spread anti-Japanese sentiment in China make Tokyo even more concerned about China’s increasing assertiveness.
Not surprisingly, Tokyo has been beefing up its military and reforming its defence policy, including a revision of US-Japanese defence guidelines, the re-interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution as well as the development of new weapons systems (e.g. “helicopter” carriers, tactical ballistic missiles). The Abe government will continue to push in this direction, especially following its recent electoral success. Bilateral disputes have in the past led to Chinese economic retaliation (e.g. ban on rare earth exports, targeting of Japanese firms in China). This is one reason why Japanese companies are seeking to diversify their supply chains in the region and especially towards countries similarly concerned about China’s territorial claims (esp. Vietnam). It has also led the Abe government to strengthen political, economic and financial ties with countries in the region.
South Korea is in a more difficult position vis-a-vis China, geographically, politically and economically, and has therefore exhibited greater ambiguity in its relations with both Beijing and Washington. The ROK is aware that alienating Beijing would be negative as far as ROK-DPRK relations are concerned. The ROK is also increasingly dependent on China in terms of trade and, especially, investment, even if there is also increasing commercial competition. On the flipside, the ROK relies on the US for its security vis-a-vis the DPRK.
Combined with far less intense competing territorial disagreements, this makes Seoul more reluctant than, for example, Japan or Vietnam, to take a firmer stance vis-a-vis China. If push came to shove, Seoul would very likely side with Washington. The only possible exception might be a scenario where the DPRK collapses and Beijing offers Seoul reunification in exchange for neutrality (a la Stalin note). Nonetheless, with the ROK depending on the US for its security, Washington will in the end have more leverage than Beijing and the ROK is very likely to throw its lot with Washington rather than Beijing. The ROK ultimately has no interest in allowing China to change the regional status quo if this risks translating into Chinese hegemony. As long as the US sticks around, this risk is remote and ROK can afford to focus on the DPRK and will seek to maintain reasonable relations with Beijing as long as possible.
Virtually all other countries in the region also support the territorial and maritime status quo. Their willingness to take back up their stance with action is largely a function of the severity and complexity of territorial disputes, economic dependence on and geographic proximity to China as well as intensity of security relationship with the United States. Vietnam and the Philippines are more wary of China than Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Washington has many actual and potential allies in the region, as the countries prefer the status quo to a more uncertain future determined by an assertive China. While not eager to irritate China unnecessarily, they welcome US efforts to counter-balance China’s rise and are extremely reluctant to yield to Chinese territorial demands.
By contrast, China has no effective allies in the region, but has territorial disputes with most of them. Only Cambodia and Laos, countries with populations of 15m and 7m and per capita incomes of USD 1,000 and USD 1,600, respectively. Nonetheless, China’s economic importance and rapidly rising defence expenditure, not to mention its increasingly advanced weapons systems mean that in the long run Beijing may feel it does not really need allies other than for diplomatic or symbolic purposes – and even here Beijing could probably resort to the middle kingdom narrative if necessary – in order to prevail in the region.