I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear its inactivity. You have become Europe’s indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead: not dominate, but to lead in reform (Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski, 2011)
A reunited Germany once again found itself in its traditional geographic central position following NATO and EU eastward expansion of the Cold War. Economically, Germany is today Europe’s pre-eminent economic power. Financially, it benefits from a very strong external creditor position and strong public finances. Germany is effectively the reserve currency country. Security-wise, Germany is now surrounded by NATO members. While it geographic location helped place it into a difficult-to-manage geo-political position after 1871, Germany today finds itself in a very favourable geo-political position following EU and NATO eastward expansion. Today Germany’s Mittellage is hugely beneficial and even allows it to free-ride more than in the past (e.g. defence expenditure).
NATO expansion and an ironclad US security guarantee effectively underwrote German security in the two and half decades following the end of the Cold War. This allowed Germany as a middle power to focus on integrating East Germany economically, while widening and deepening European economic integration, primarily in the guise of eastward expansion and monetary union. Germany is effectively a trading state (Rosencrance 1986) within a multilateral, rule-based economic and security order. Today it looks increasingly as if Germany may have to prepare for the possibility of a less globally engaged United States. Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has played a more passive international role with respect to Europe. The Trump administration’s America First policy has reinforced this trend. It remains to be seen if a different administration will re-assert US commitment to multilateralism. Whatever happens, Germany and Europe would be well-advised to rely on the US and at least prepare for the possibility of the US not underwriting the global multilateral economic and Western security regime.
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| Germany's geo-political position |
A number of shocks have brought home the need to pursue a more active and strategic foreign policy. A more assertive Russia (Ukraine, Syria, cyber). A large influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. The US administration’s more reserved attitude towards NATO. US attacks on the multilateral trade regime. Brexit. Populism in various EU member states. A vulnerable European and especially euro area economy.
Historically, Germany has supported an “ever closer union”, preferably in the form a federal Europe, while France has been more keen to maintain sovereignty and strive for a more inter-governmental Europe. To some extent these differences reflect historical legacies. Throughout much of its history, Germany has had a decentralized, multi-level governance structure. It certainly does so today. France, by comparison, has always been a highly centralised nation-state. Germany is historically and culturally more comfortable with EU multi-level governance given its past history and federal structure. France, by contrast, has a long history of being a centralised nation-state with a homogenous, Paris-based elite. European integration after WWII was a way for a defeated Germany to regain international recognition and influence. For France it was a way to check or at least to manage a re-emerging Germany and gain a greater voice in international affairs in the context of superpower competition. These historical dynamics may be changing now that Germany has re-emerged.
It remains to be seen to what extent Germany, as the most influential EU member-state, is willing to transfer power to supra-national structures. It is only likely to do so if such a transfer reflects its preferences. Germany has always had preferences, but it is reasonable to foresee that Germany will see its preferences realised more so than in the past. Following WWII, Germany sought “re-admission to the human civilization”. It pursued Western European and trans-Atlantic economic integration in addition to maintaining a close security partnership in the guise of NATO. It sought to open foreign markets to sell its technologically advanced, industrial goods. Germany regained sovereignty by tying itself closely to the project of European integration and, some say, by signing up to the euro.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Germany can no longer afford to be solely at trading state. The euro area crisis is a good example. Berlin was initially very reluctant to take the lead, but ultimately self-interest, notably the risk of a financial crisis or, worse, the implosion of the euro area, forced it to exercise leadership in order to steer reforms in a direction that would help preserve the euro area at acceptable financial costs/ risks to itself. Should the international trade regime come under further pressure, Germany is likely to adopt a more active policy stance by seeking support among trade-dependent middle-ranking powers, including China, in an attempt to preserve a multilateral, rule-governed international trade regime. As more active and assertive foreign policy will be difficult but not impossible to sell to German voters.
Parts of Germany’s foreign policy establishment and popular opinion are not keen to exercise more power - or at least “hard” power. Even where it exercises power (e.g. euro area reform), it remains somewhat uncomfortable doing so (or so it pretends). While Germany is no doubt well-advised to exercise power very judiciously, its size and importance make Germany a necessary part of any European problem. The elites are beginning to accept this. The speech by German President Joachim Gauck at the 2015 Munich Security Conference and Angele Merkel’s beer tent speech in May 2017 signalled as much. Some German analysts have talked about a “Vormacht wider Willen” (Bierling 2014). Others have suggested Germany take on a role of “subservient leadership” (Techau 2017) or similarly analyzed the concepts of “Macht der Mitte” (Munkler 2015). This just goes to show that the discourse is changing, even though there is some residual elite resistance and certainly greater popular resistance to Germany playing a more assertive role and taking a leadership role.
Germany needs a strategy and Germany needs to discuss what the of strategy will help it achieve its goals. Strategy seeks to reconcile ends and means. Strategy or grand strategy describes the calculated relationship between means and end, between a state’s political, economic, financial and military capabilities and its stated objectives (Gaddis, Liddell Hart). Strategy also requires a longer-term plan and differs from merely tactical responses and short-term pressure. Take the euro area, for example. During the euro area crisis, Germany not surprisingly had little choice but to take a tactical approach. When the house is on fire, immediate action is required. But is the euro area sufficiently prepared for the next crisis? Economically, EMU will need to be sustainable. Financially, it will need to be resilient. Politically, it will need to be seen as legitimate. Germany would be well-advised to take a strategic approach to the euro area rather than wait for the next crisis to drive reforms.
For the moment, Germany remains a geo-economic power (Luttwak 1990) but a geoefconomci power that can ill-afford to pretend to behave like a middle-sized trading state (Rosencrance 1986, 1990). As a geo-economic power, Germany managed to impose or, depending on your point of view, extend its economic model to the rest of Europe. But Germany will need to develop more of a strategic vision as far as its core security and economic interests are concerned. ThIs will require a more forward-looking and assertive foreign policy. If Germany and European do not work out a coherent strategy, the in the best case scenario “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted in those crises” (Jean Monnet). Even if a crisis does not bring down Europe, the costs of a purely tactical approach are bound to be far greater than if Germany and Europe adopted a ore forward-looking approach.