Economic inequality, socio-cultural conflicts and ideological polarisation have characterised the US domestic policy for quite some time. The election of Joe Biden is unlikely to change that. Too deep are the ideological, economic and geographic divisions that run through Washington and the country. Although Biden won only 509 out of 3,143 counties, these account for well over 70% of US GDP (Brookings 2020). This reflects a deep urban-rural cleavage. It also reflects the cleavage between economically prosperous and economically declining parts of the US, as well as a cleavage between ethnically homogeneous rural and multi-ethnic urban areas.
The political institutions are also highly polarised. The party-political fronts are largely deadlocked. In the Senate, 80-90% of senators are regularly re-elected. In the House, more than 90% of the representatives are re-elected (Pew 2021). Only about 15% of the 435 seats in the House are still contested - and not firmly under either Republican or Democratic control. In the Senate, the situation is very similar. The extent of geographical polarization is also reflected in the fact 94 out of 100 senators ran on the same party ticket as the presidential candidate who won the majority in the respective state. In the last Senate elections, only one Senate candidate managed to be elected in a state that did not also vote for the presidential candidate of the same party. And Biden won with just 51%, despite a collapsing economy and a devastating pandemic. This shows how much political polarization has become entrenched.
Gerrymandering, often combined with a system of closed primaries, has resulted in election campaigns being fought at the political margins. Once elected, political representatives have few incentives to move back to the political centre and seek political compromises. Cognitive biases also strengthen negative partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster 2016), while the social media and even conspiracy theories further strengthen social and political polarisation. Large parts of US society increasingly seem to live in alternative realities: 2/3 of Republicans believe that large-scale voter fraud took place in the last presidential election, while only 1/10 of Democrats believe so.
Due to polarization, the political system does not provide enough output legitimacy. This in turn contributes to popular dissatisfaction and it undermines the confidence in the ability of the political solve urgent problems. Reduced problem-solving capacity and political polarization (and also economic inequality) seem to be mutually reinforce each other. On the one hand, political polarisation prevents the necessary compromises to solve existing problems. On the other hand, increasing problems reinforce political polarisation. A comparatively high number of veto players (House of Representatives, Senate, President, Constitutional Court) also increased political-institutional and political gridlock.
The election of Joe Bidens as the 46th president will not do much to change this situation. Democrats now control razor-thin majorities in the House and Senate, but the risk of a political blockade remains – not least because of the so-called filibusters. The filibuster allows an individual senator to prevent a motion from being voted. Shutting down a filibuster requires a supermajority of 60 (out of 100) senators. Democrats currently only control 50 seats in the Senate. That's why the Biden administration will find it difficult to get its ambitious domestic agenda through Congress. The risk of a domestic political blockade therefore remains. (In principle, Democrats could try to eliminate the filibuster altogether, but this doesn't seem very likely now that some Democrats have opposed it.)
Compromise could become more likely if Republican members of congress were to turn their backs on Trumpism and shift towards a more moderate, compromise-oriented position. Following the attack on the Capitol, it looked like this become a possibility. Judging by Republicans’ recent rhetoric and voting behavior (e.g. election certification, impeachment articles), Trumpism and populism will continue to be significant factor in Republican politics as well as the political calculus of Republican members of congress. Continued intraparty between moderates and populist makes it politically risky for moderate Republicans to seek compromises with the Democratic majority.
True, the confirmation of key cabinet nominees in the Senate, which is traditionally more moderate than the House of Representatives, has progressed without much resistance. There are however disagreements on the fiscal stimulus package. Attempts to create a bipartisan majority of 60 senators has so far made little progress. And fiscal policy should be a less contentious issue in the current economic situation than other Democratic proposals. Nevertheless, as far as budget policy is concerned, the Democrats can, if necessary, resort to budget reconciliation. This makes it possible to pass fiscal policy measures with only simple majorities in both houses of congress. It is also crucial that the Budget Control Act of 2011 will expire. Over the past decade, the act not only limited the increase in government spending in general but also linked non-military discretionary spending to increases in defense outlays. Starting in fiscal year 2022, these restrictions will disappear, giving the Democratic majority significant room for manoeuvre.
Democrats now have to decide whether they are willing to seek Republican support for the proposed fiscal package by way of making concessions to moderate Republicans or, alternatively, use budget reconciliation to pass their preferred program against Republican opposition. If the Democrats were to opt for the latter, it would make it politically more difficult, if not entirely impossible, to push through the proposed, large-scale investment program with focus on green technology and infrastructure, let alone politically more controversial proposals (e.g. immigration, health).
Republicans would likely move towards blockading most Democratic proposals through extensive use of the filibuster. Since Democrats must assume that they will lose their majorities(s) in 2022 – the president's party usually suffers significant losses in the midterms – they will do their utmost to get as much of their legislative programme through Congress and do so as aggressively and as quickly as they possibly can in the next 18 months. In this case, it would be hard to see how polarization can decline and politics will shift towards greater compromise and bipartisanship.
Continued polarization will have a lesser impact on Biden’s foreign policy. In terms of security policy – and this is evident in the choice of his cabinet – Biden will commit to and strengthen existing military alliances in Europe and Asia. The new administration will also take firm position vis-à-vis China and Russia. Such a policy has broad bipartisan support in Washington. Biden will also try to work with China and Russia in selected policy areas (e.g. arms agreements, climate). This will face stronger opposition in the Republican Party. It will not dissuade the Biden administration from pursuing such a policy.
As far as economic policy is concerned, the new administration will initially focus on domestic economic problems. There will be closer cooperation with allies on foreign economic policy. Although there initially will not be any support for further trade liberalisation, there will be US efforts to reform important aspects of the international multilateral regime (especially WTO) in coordination with Washington's allies. In addition to such institutional reforms, there will also be further attempts to resolve more specific bilateral problems between the US and the EU (e.g. digital tax, Airbus-Boeing, steel tariffs).
Europeans would be well advised to help solve of these bilateral issues and support US efforts to reform the framework for multilateral cooperation. This should also be done, not least in view of strengthening internationalist political forces in the US by allowing them to sell international cooperation as a political gain at home. A multilateral, cooperation-based international economic system that creates a level playing field for the most important players is very much in Europe’s and especially Germany’s national interest. Germany and Europe should seize the opportunity to revive transatlantic cooperation offered by the Biden administration.
The Biden administration will be inclined to pursue a more value-based foreign policy than was the case under the Trump administration. Although the idea of an "alliance of democracies" is to be viewed with skepticism, illiberal states (e.g. Hungary, Poland), including some middle powers (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Turkey), will find it more difficult to deal with Washington. It remains to be seen to what extent this policy makes strategic sense, especially in view of the emerging systemic conflict with China. Whether in terms of trade, financial or security policy, the Biden administration will increasingly see the world through the prism of emerging Sino-US competition. If there is an issue that enjoys bipartisan support in Washington, it is to pursue a more hawkish policy towards China (and Russia).
In summary, continued domestic polarisation will create important obstacles in terms of the Biden administration’s domestic reform agenda. The Biden administration may be able to bypass Republican opposition with respect to fiscal policy. However, this will not be possible – or at least much more difficult – in other policy areas. It remains to be seen whether the girondistes or the jacobins will win the civil war in the Republican Party. If the populists win, domestic political gridlock and political polarisation will intensify. The outcome of this intra-party conflict will nonetheless have greater consequences for US domestic policy than for US foreign policy.
* Thank you to JMK/ DGAP for helpful comments
