U.S. reciprocal tariffs risk causing a major loss of global economic confidence and an economic downturn. However, the experience of the 1930s, if heeded by policymakers outside the United States, will help the world economy avoid a prolonged slump akin to the Great Depression. The United States' "reciprocal tariffs" announced on April 2 (and paused for 90 days on April 9) represent the most far-reaching set of protectionist trade measures the United States, or any other major country, has imposed since the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariffs in 1930. Today, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs are widely seen as having exacerbated and prolonged what came to be called the Great Depression. But they were not its cause.
Instead, a major financial crisis and the domestic economic policies of countries around the world were the main root causes of the Great Depression. In the 1930s, following the economic downturn caused by the 1929 Wall Street crash and subsequent international financial crisis, many governments focused on reducing their public deficits at a time when demand, both domestic and external, was weak. They also implemented orthodox monetary policies, often tied to gold, and allowed banks to go bankrupt, which further limited liquidity and destroyed wealth in the form of bank deposits. Together, these policies exacerbated the global economic slump and delayed a recovery, which started as soon as states absorbed the impact of protectionism and focused on domestic demand stimulus.
If today's policymakers heed the lessons of the 1930s, the economic fallout of U.S. protectionism will be significantly more manageable, if nonetheless economically and financially painful. Modernpolicymakers understand that a major negative demand shock stemming from higher tariffs makes it imperative to support domestic demand and to intervene in case of financial distress to avert greater structural damage to the economy. Though some are more constrained than others, many countries canease macroeconomic policies by cutting interest rates to support domestic asset prices, domestic credit and economic growth. A welcome side effect of such a policy would be a devaluation of their exchange rates, which would help offset parts of the U.S. tariffs, provided that countries have, as most of the world's major economies do, flexible exchange rate regimes and provided the United States does not raise tariffs even further in response. Tariffed countries will also have greater scope to cut interest rates than the United States, as the effect of tariffs abroad may be deflationary, while tariffs will beinflationary in the United States.
The countries hit hardest by U.S. protectionism have several domestic economic policy options to address slowing economic growth. First, a much weaker growth outlook could cause deflationary pressure, warranting currency depreciation to make exports more competitive and support economic growth.Second, instead of trying to balance the budget in a vain effort to reestablish credibility, as happened in the 1930s, governments can let automatic fiscal stabilizers like progressive tax systems and transfer payments play their role in buffering the slowdown of domestic demand. Third, countries with greater fiscal space can launch policies that counteract the effects of the recessionary fiscal cycle, such as tax cuts or increased government spending, to maintain economic growth and absorb excess production due to lower exports domestically.
As it happens, Europe is loosening its fiscal stringsto facilitate higher defense spending. For instance,Europe's largest economy, Germany, just reformed its debt brake and is embarking on a major investment and defense expenditure spree. This will help soften the blow of U.S. tariffs and offset part of the country's slowed economic growth resulting from lower exports. China, hardest hit by U.S. tariffs, will also have increased incentives to support domestic demand through higher fiscal spending to offset lower exports, in addition to allowing for a gradual, managed currency adjustment.
Countries' trade policies will also have a significant impact on the effects of U.S. protectionism. Standard economic theory posits that tariffs and, in particular, tit-for-tat trade wars reduce economic welfare for all parties involved. This theory proved true in the 1930s, when countries opted for beggar-thy-neighbor policies, whereby they tried to "steal" demand from one another by diverting their exports to countries, whether through protectionist trade restrictions or competitive currency devaluation. This time around, policymakers know that refraining from broad trade conflict and keeping markets open (despite political challenges) will help affected countries alleviate the most severe economic impacts of U.S. tariffs and avoid a depression-type economic downturn.
Although there are no guarantees about what direction policymakers will take in reaction to U.S. protectionism, many have repeatedly demonstrated a desire for cooperative trade policy. For instance, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, concerns about increasing trade protectionism led to the creation of the Group of 20 nations to avoid mutually damaging economic policies. More recently, China paused retaliation against the European Union over protectionist EU measures targeting China, and many countries and blocs are attempting to establish free trade agreements, including the United Arab Emirates and the European Union, India and New Zealand, and China and Bangladesh. These examples illustrate that policymakers are taking to heart lessons learned in the Great Depression. However, even if cooperation fails and beggar-thy-neigbor policies prevail, most countries' ability to support domestic demand to replace declines in exports should help make the current crisis much more manageable than in the 1930s.
It is too early to say what precise economic effect U.S. protectionism will have on the global economy, let alone on individual economies, given the continued uncertainty about the Trump administration's trade policy, but the world is much more likely to avoid a prolonged economic slump now than it was in the 1930s. The United States remains a major source of international demand, but it is not the world's sole export destination, and governments understand what macroeconomic responses can help avert a worst-case scenario. So while economies around the world will feel the pinch of recent U.S. protectionist policies -- and some countries will undoubtedly dip into recession, perhaps including the United States -- a rerun of the Great Depression with its all-out protectionism, wrong-headed macroeconomic policies, and dramatic and prolonged financial sector crisis is unlikely, provided the rest of the world heeds the lessons of the past.