“Too big for Europe, too small for the world” (Henry Kissinger)
The German question dominated European politics at the very least from the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 to Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender in 1945. The German question remained a key factor of the European geo-political landscape during the Cold War. Following the total defeat and division of Germany after 1945, the emergence of two super-powers transformed the European state system from a multi-polar into a bi-polar order dominated by extra-European states. The German question continued to matter, but it continued to matter in a different way. Neither super-power was prepared to give up its respective foothold in defeated Germany in the face of zero-sum competition under a bipolar international order (Waltz 1964). Therefore two German states emerged, each closely aligned with one of the super powers. The German problem had ceased to be one related to potential German hegemony. Like the Thirty Years’ war, Germany became the battleground for other powers. Like much of the rest of Europe, Germany largely lost agency. European fears of a hegemonic Germany capable of dominating much or all of Western and Eastern Europe were at best just that: fears. Germany was divided, played a subservient role militarily and was in fact “semi-sovereign” (Katzenstein 1987), even if West Germany gradually began to emerge as the leading economic power in Western Europe.
The end of the Cold War and German re-unification did not lead to the reemergence of the German question. Germany remained a member of the European Community and later the European Union. It also remained a member of NATO. The United States, the world’s only remaining superpower, maintained its military presence in Europe and a commitment to stability. Having achieved security and economic prosperity, Germany strongly supported the extension of the security and economic architecture to Eastern Europe. It remained strongly committed to its traditional Atlanticist and European partners. However, the creation of a common currency, which was at least in part driven by broader geopolitical considerations, including continued concern about Germany’s economic and financial strength, instead of leading a more balanced economic and financial structure in Europe, actually ended up increasing German power and influence. It also increased German sensitivity, as closer economic integration almost always does, and therefore forced the Berlin Republic to play a more active and more influential role as far as Europe’s economic and financial policies were concerned.
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| Germany's Shifting Central Position |
It is too early to say to what extent greater US unilateralism will prevail in the medium term following the 2016 US presidential election. But increasingly focussed on China, Washington will likely seek greater burden-sharing from its long-standing European allies. Similarly, the current US administration has become more adversarial in as far as trade relations are concerned. This is an area where the Germany due to its trade openness is particularly sensitive. Greater US protectionism may turn out to be more of a structural shift given US relative decline and increasing concerns about China’s rise. It is far from clear that the Berlin Republic will be able to rely on US security guarantees forever. Post-WWII German elites and the German citizens by and large followed US leadership in the security realm, while largely pursuing the policies of a trading state (Rosencrance 1986). A weakening US commitment to European security will force Germany and and its European partners into a fundamental rethink of their individual and common security policies.
It does look like the post-WWII regime has begun to change in fundamental ways. A more assertive Russia and a less reliable United States, instability in the Middle East, migration and intra-European fragility in the guise of the euro area crisis and increasing tensions within the EU, not to mention Brexit, create significant challenges to German foreign policy. Germany - whether it likes it or not - will need to play a more active role. This is both a predication and a prescription. This does not mean greater German unilateralism. In fact, quite the opposite. Germany will need to exercise leadership in the sense to getting other European countries to support common policies that serve European economic prosperity and security in the face of a more unilateralist and isolationist US and a more assertive Russia. This will require a strategic vision of Europe’s future. It will also require political consensus, political legitimacy and leadership. It is too small to impose its will on the other European countries, let alone the US or Russia. But absent a more assertive and strategic as opposed to reactive foreign policy, Europe will lack the leadership to confront the emerging economic and security challenges. German power and interest will critically shape European international politics. Hopefully it will not give rise to the German question, even if Germany begins to play more of a leadership role than hitherto.