German foreign policy under the Nazis represented - in important respects - a continuation of the policies pursued by the Wilhelmine Empire (Dehio 1948, Dehio [1955] 2015, Calleo 1980). The so-called “security dilemma” was a major factor underpinning this continuity. States typically seek security and they seek economic prosperity. Economic prosperity is a pre-condition for security. If a state fails to achieve economic prosperity and physical security, it may succumb to competition in an anarchical state system or it may end up playing a subordinate role in it. This framework offers a useful perspective and adds to an understanding of German foreign policy. Security depends on a variety of other factors, including alliances, economic power, geography, diplomacy.
Geography is a crucial and yet often under-appreciated factor influencing a state’s foreign policy. As AJP Taylor ([1945] 2011) observed in his highly readable “The Course of German History”.
"The Germans are the people of the north European plain, the people without a defined natural frontier. Without the sharp limit of mountain ranges, except at the Alps and the Bohemian mountains, the great plain is intersected by four great rivers (Rhine, Elbe, Oder, Vistula), dividing lines sharp enough to split the German people up amongst themselves, not rigid enough to confine them within settled frontiers. There is no determined geographic point for German expansion, equally none for German contraction; and, in the course of a thousand years, geographic Germany has gone out and in like a concertina. At times Germany has been confined within the Rhine and the Elbe; at others it has blown itself out to the Pyrenees and to the Caucasus. Every German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent; that is the permanence of German geography" (Taylor 2001 [1945]: 2).
The Baltic and North Seas to the North, the Alps to the South represent physical barriers of sorts. The mountain ranges near the Rhine to the West represent a far less formidable obstacle. And even less formidable are the rivers flowing south to north, the Elbe, the Oder and the Vistula on the north European plain. The lands east of the Elbe have historically been less densely populated and economically less advanced than the lands west of the Rhine. This explains much of Germany’s demographic, economic, political and often enough military expansion eastwards. The so-called Drang nach Osten led to a more or less steady expansion of German language and culture as well as economic and political power in the East. What began with the invitation of German farmers by Polish rulers and the aggression of military-spiritual orders in the late Middle Ages ended with the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century and the quest for Lebensraum against the Soviet Union in 1941-45. Germany’s political, economic and military collapse in 1945 led to the elimination of German influence and the German presence in region, following the expulsion of Germans from the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, territorial losses and loss of sovereignty. With the end of the Cold War and German re-unification, Eastern Europe once more opened up to German political and economic influence. The demise of the bi-polar order and the economic and political integration of much of Eastern Europe into the EU and NATO have allowed some geo-graphic and geo-political continuities to re-assert themselves.
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| Northern European Plain |
Geography also matters to the extent that contemporary Germany traces its lineage back to Prussia, a state that emerged on the Northern European plain. Its geographic position had a significant influence on the kind of state that Prussia and later Germany would become. Neither Prussia nor the German Empire had the benefit of being protected by natural barriers to its East or West. It is therefore not surprising that Prussia and later Germany was characterised by a relatively strong and efficient state capable of mobilizing (initially) scarce resources in order to withstand competition. Prussian militarism and a so-called garrison state were pre-conditions for Prussia’s geopolitical survival, if not the only ones. Mirabeau is said to have observed that “Prussia is not a state with an army, but an army with state”. Nationalism may eventually have led to the emergence of a unified German state. As it happened, a militarily successful and aggressive Prussia unified Germany under its leadership in 1871. In other words, Germany’s geographic and geo-political position favored the emergence of a successful and military aggressive state due to strong ecological-geographic pressures.
Europe’s political centre had more of than not been fragmented and weak. This occasionally turned it into Europe’s battleground, most importantly during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), which devastated large parts of Central Europe, including Germany. The political fragmentation of German lands and rivalry among German states had disastrous consequences. The failure of the 1848 national and democratic revolution famously led Bismarck to remark: “The great questions of the time are not decided by speeches and majority decisions — that was the error of 1848 and 1849 — but by iron and blood”. And so they were. Bismarck’s statement also needs to be interpreted of what then were deep-seated concerns in Prussia and Germany about it falling victim to outside aggression. In the early 20th century, encirclement became a popular way to see Germany’s geopolitical position, especially after Britain, France and Russia settled their major political differences.
A particularly aggressive and successful state was bound to have the upper hand once territorial consolidation got underway. Prussia’s aggressive and adventurist foreign policy almost spelt its disaster under Frederick II. Prussia might well have disappeared from the map, or at least eliminated as a European great power, had it not been for the balance-of-power working out. Prussia’s defeat during the Napoleonic wars once more threatened its existence as a great power. Subsequent fundamental reform helped lay the foundation for Prussia’s meteoric geo-political rise during the 19th century. Had Prussia failed to reform itself, it would not likely have become the power to unify German lands, at all. This shows that a strong military was not a sufficient condition for Prussia to emerge as a great power, but it does suggest that it was a necessary one.
Increasing territorial consolidation in Europe until 1918 did lead to the disappearance of many states. Its ability not just to withstand geopolitical competition (and survive) but also to take advantage of the territorial consolidation taking place during the 18th and 19th century points to Prussia’s fitness and adaptability (Pierson 2004). A strong state heavily investing in security, while not always sufficient to avoid occasional defeat, was a pre-condition for survival and geopolitical success. German warfare and military strategy can also be understood as an adaptation to geopolitical circumstances and resource constraints (Citino 2005). The Prussia-dominated German Empire emerged as the most powerful state in Europe. Unable to adapt, its Polish neighbour disappeared from the map in the wake of geopolitical competition and territorial consolidation in the late 18th century. Poland’s fate and Prussia’s relative success illustrate the evolutionary logic and the need for states (and their domestic institutions) to adapt in the face of ecological pressures (Giddens 1987, Tilly 1993). Competition was fierce on the north European plain. Again, this is not to deny that balance-of-power dynamics and diplomatic consideration were also important helping Prussia avoid a fate similar to Poland’s.
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| Prussia's Territorial Expansion |
As territorial consolation started and the balance-of-power system failed to do its job, Prussia became more and more powerful and militarily successful. Its territory and population increased, which in turn allowed it to become more powerful and accumulate more resources and so on. (From a different perspective, one can attribute this success in part to the rise of nationalism, of course. The point is simply that the dynamics of the system favored consolidation under a militarily aggressive state.) The wars of unification led to a significant increase of Prussian power. Adept diplomacy was equally important, as was, arguably, nationalism. Once it had established its preponderant position in Germany after defeating Austria-Hungary in 1866, Prussia, supported by other German states, defeated Napoleon III’s France and the unified Germany under Prussian leadership, while excluding Austria-Hungary. This effectively established Germany as a semi-hegenomic power in continental Europe. The subsequent economic and demographic growth support strengthened Germany’s position in material, if not necessarily in diplomatic terms.
Bismarck recognised that any further increase in German power would risk jeopardising Germany’s position and security. This explains why Bismarck sought to pursue ensure that the other European powers remained at loggerheads (Kissinger Diktat), to make Germany the indispensable, balance-maintaining power in Europe. and his desire to avoid the so-called cauchemar des coalitions and especially a possible two-front war. Bismarck’s insistence on Germany being a “saturated power” and as acting as an “honest broker” can be seen as part of the same diplomatic goal. Bismarck was acutely aware of Germany’s difficult geo-political position. Forward-looking statesmen at the time understood that German reunification has upset Europe’s balance-of-power for good. As British Prime Minister
Benjamin Disraeli put it as early as 1871:
"This war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than the French revolution of last century […] Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity incident to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions in this House about the balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed the ship of State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve an equilibrium in Europe. [ . . . ] But what has really come to pass? The balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England" (February 9, 1871).
Historians would reject a system-level explanation of of Prussia’s and Germany’s rise as overly simplistic. International politics, diplomacy, nationalism and a great many other factors influenced the rise of Prussia. It is also not difficult to see come up with a counterfactual where Prussia would not have become the preponderant power in Germany. But the systems’ framework does allow for interesting insights and offers a useful way to think about Prussia’s and after 1871 Germany’s rise.
Benjamin Disraeli put it as early as 1871:
"This war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than the French revolution of last century […] Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity incident to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions in this House about the balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed the ship of State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve an equilibrium in Europe. [ . . . ] But what has really come to pass? The balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England" (February 9, 1871).
Historians would reject a system-level explanation of of Prussia’s and Germany’s rise as overly simplistic. International politics, diplomacy, nationalism and a great many other factors influenced the rise of Prussia. It is also not difficult to see come up with a counterfactual where Prussia would not have become the preponderant power in Germany. But the systems’ framework does allow for interesting insights and offers a useful way to think about Prussia’s and after 1871 Germany’s rise.
The German state that emerged in 1871 largely reflected Prussia’s geopolitical success. It also inherited and even amplified Prussia’s geographic and geo-political vulnerability. Political geography also helps explain why Germany had a large land army. As a land power, Germany was forced to spend much more resources on its army and securing its western and eastern borders against other European powers, where it was now facing a revanchist France, following the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and a rapidly rising Russia. Skillful diplomacy might have allowed Germany to make its semi-hegemonic position manageable. After all, mange it did, if just barely, under Bismarck’s reign (1871-90). But all other things equal, Germany’s geographic position was potentially more precarious than that of any other European power. System-level competitive pressures and path dependency help offer interesting insights explaining the rise of Prussia and Germany, and more. Contrast Germany’s gee-political position with that of the other European powers at the time.
Britain with its island geography, once it had secured control over the British Isles, was able to focus on overseas colonial expansion and was not in need of maintaining a large standing army. This may also explain Britain’s greater propensity towards political liberalism and free trade and the tendency to attribute greater weight to commercial considerations than was the case in other European countries - and certainly compared to Germany’s more conservative-authoritarian political regime and more state-led economic development (Gerschenkron 1962). This also explains Britain’s long-established policy of “splendid isolation” until the late 19th century and its ultimate strategic objective: prevent the emergence of a hegemonic power in continental Europe. Such a hegemonic power would control all the resources of continental Europe and be in a position to take on the Royal Navy and subdue Britain.
France’s position was more difficult. Geographically, the only significant potential threat on the continent was an alliance of German states or, worse, a unified German state under centralised leadership. Only if Germany remained weak was France able to feel secure and perhaps be in a position to compete with Britain overseas. Looking across the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean was either unnecessary or promised little reward. Neither economically less developed Spain nor Italy posed the same potential political and military threat.
Russia had the benefit of being an oversized country geographically with immense resources. It could afford to be invaded time and again - not that this was its preference (but without out it, we would not have War and Peace). Its strategic depth saved it more than once in the past two hundred odd years. The fact that it ended up surviving the Napoleonic invasion did of course nothing to make it feel more secure. Following the emergence of Imperial Germany, it now had land borders with a demographically, economically and militarily rising unified Germany. This was Russia’s main security concern. Russia itself was modernisiing rapidly towards in the decades leading up to WWI and this raised the feeling of insecurity in Germany, certainly among its military (Cooper 2000).
A country’s geo-political position is bound to have an impact on its domestic institutions, political culture and economic development as well as its foreign and security policies. Germany’s 20th century history offers a tragic example of the importance of geography in international affairs. Geography did matter in the past and it continues to matter today - and not just in Europe.