Geography matters. It affects, but does not determine, the distribution of wealth within countries, trade between economies and foreign relations between states. Geography also helps shape the geo-political interaction among the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). As the emergence of the BRICs and, in the case of China and India, the quest to secure access to natural resources and protect lines of communication intensify, geo-strategic competition among geographically contiguous China, India and Russia will increase. Brazil will stand relatively aloof thanks to its relative geographic isolation.
Geography matters. It affects, but does not determine, the distribution of wealth within countries, trade between economies and foreign relations between states. In the BRIC countries, the degree of economic concentration varies. The Sao Paulo - Rio de Janeiro agglomeration in Brazil, the Greater Moscow region plus St. Petersburg in Russia and the Eastern seaboard coastal corridor stretching from Guandong to Shandong in China each account for upwards of 1/3 of national economic activity. India appears to exhibit less concentration. Its largest state in economic terms, Maharashtra, accounts for little more than 10% of GDP.
The location of these economic centres affects trade patterns. For instance, Moscow is “land-locked” and squarely faces Western Europe, not a port city like Vladivostok facing East Asia. No wonder that the EU (and Europe) is by far Russia’s most important trading partner. East Asia is very distant and formidable geographic barriers exist in relation to West and South Asia. By contrast, the Sao Paulo - Rio agglomeration faces the South Atlantic, allowing Brazil to look in almost equal measure to North America, Western Europe and Western Africa. This may help explain Brazil’s relatively high degree of geographic export diversification. Similarly, India’s main economic centres face seaward. So do China’s economically most important provinces. Seaborne trade has similarly resulted in geo-graphically diversified trade patterns.
Naturally, geography does not determine trade. After all, China became Brazil’s largest export market last year and China’s exports to the geographically distant EU are about the same as to the less-distant US. The geographic “angle” needs to be supplemented with the theory of comparative advantage, economic size and trade policies to fully account for the structure and direction of trade. Nonetheless, the interplay of geography, economic accumulation and trade is important to understanding BRIC economic development and trade flows.
Geography also matters greatly as regards foreign relations among states. For instance, “strategic depth” (that is, the distance between a potential frontline and the economic-political “heartland”) continues to play an important role in the minds of policy-makers. Russia has historically benefitted from strategic depth, saving it from military defeat more than once during the past two centuries. In addition to economic interests, this is one reason why Moscow seeks to regain influence in its “near abroad”. Geography also explains in part why Beijing is preoccupied with Taiwan. If Korea was a dagger pointing at Japan, well, Taiwan points straight at the heart of China’s economically pivotal Eastern seaboard. “Taiwan” is therefore far from being merely an issue of “sovereignty”.
If the concept of geography is extended to include natural resource endowment, its heuristic reach increases. China’s increasing dependence on access to strategically important commodity imports will not only drive a more active (resource) diplomacy, but sooner or later it will lead Beijing to field full-scale blue-water navy in order to protect economically vital sea lanes. Meanwhile, India, whose dependence on commodity imports is also increasing and which is forced to rely on seaborne trade given its geographic location, wants to maintain naval superiority in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, vis-à-vis non-US navies. It is therefore no surprise that New Delhi has more than once expressed concern about Beijing’s expanding economic interests and civilian naval presence in India’s “backyard”. The confluence of geography and increasing trade (and resource) dependence will be hugely important in shaping the interaction of Asia’s two emerging giants for decades to come.
Compare this to Brazil, whose security challenges are substantially less significant in this respect. Driven by the desire to protect its coastline and off-shore oilfields, Brasilia has taken advantage of rapid economic growth to upgrade its air force and navy. Generally co-operative and friendly relations with the US, whose navy effectively controls the North and South Atlantic, and a more limited trade and resource dependence do not put Brazil at risk of geo-political competition with another rising power.
It is noteworthy that three of the four BRIC countries face the prospect of potential geopolitical competition with one another. Amongst other things, Moscow is concerned about its sparsely populated and demographically declining Far East being pulled into the Chinese orbit. India is concerned about China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, while China is concerned about protecting its lines of communications, potentially putting it at odds with both New Delhi and Washington – and less so, Moscow. Geographically isolated Brazil stands relatively aloof, as the emergence of the BRICs leads to a reconfiguration of power and potentially intensifying geo-strategic competition among them in South and North-East Asia. In any event, geography will help structure the emerging pattern of economic and political co-operation and competition among the BRICs. Geography matters– more than economists generally acknowledge.