Rising powers tend to challenge the status quo. This is hardly surprising. If international regimes and institutions exist, they are likely to reflect the interests of the dominant power or powers that created or modified them over time. Even if the rising power accepts the existing arrangements, it will seek to gain a greater say within them. In other words: sometimes rising powers seek overthrow the existing regime, and sometimes they will seek to modify the balance-of-power while remaining supportive of the basic function and structure of the regime. The degree to which change takes place will vary by issue area and is determined by the ability to resist change by the status quo powers as well as their willingness to accommodate the rising power. The rise of a state to economic supremacy generally proves disruptive.
China is likely to have little interest in changing the main pillars of the international trade and financial regime. After all, it has done rather nicely. But it will want to have greater say within the existing structures and institutions. In other areas, China may seek more fundamental changes (e.g. maritime claims). Many analysts have likened China’s rise to that of the German Empire after 1871 and fully expect China’s rise to be similarly destabilising (Friedberg 2011; Mearsheimer [2001] 2003: chapter 10). Others believe that China, benefitting hugely from the current global system, will become a “responsible shareholder” (Shambaugh 2005; Ikenberry 2008).
Nonetheless, historical experience suggests that great power transitions give rise to instability, and, historically, more often than not great power war (Gilpin 1981, Kennedy 1987). Power transition theory postulates that “(a)n even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger; power that is most likely to be the aggressor” (Organski 1958). A weak state or coalition of states is unlikely to directly challenge the dominant power militarily. Knowing that there is little chance of success, weaker states will refrain from challenging the dominant power. Once dominant power and challenger move closer to economic-military parity and it becomes less obvious who would prevail in a direct confrontation. Moreover, the dominant power fearing to lose ground may be led to engage in prevention.
Economic interdependence risks making military conflict more painful and nuclear weapons would make it potentially more destructive. Certainly, as WWI demonstrated, economic integration is not an absolute barrier to military conflict. It remains to be seen to what extent the existence of nuclear weapons will help prevent a great power war. Accounting for the existence of nuclear weapons, which makes a direct military confrontation unlikely, competition and confrontation does not necessarily take place in the form of military confrontation. More likely, this will play out in diplomatic, economic and political terms against the backdrop of on-going military competition, but not an outright confrontation. The Cold War did end without a clash between the US and the Soviet Union.
Washington is responding to the perceived rise in Chinese power and capabilities in the political and military sphere by strengthening relations with its regional allies (e.g. Australia, India, Japan) and potential partners/ allies (e.g. Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam) and increasing its military (naval) posture in the region, while treading cautiously in areas of more direct concern to Beijing (e.g. Taiwan). At the same time, Washington is seeking to engage Beijing in the economic sphere, albeit it with limited success thus far (e.g. currency policy). The “responsible shareholder” school foresees, not least because Beijing (in their view) will remain focused on domestic economic development (“peaceful rise”, “peaceful development”) and therefore would be foolish to challenge a political and economic set-up from which it has benefitted tremendously over the past three decades. Sure, recent diplomatic and naval clashes with its neighbours over a variety of maritime claims (Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam) as well as territorial disputes (India) is not exactly helping to mollify China’s neighbours.