Will China’s economic and political rise prove destabilising? Scholarly, let alone political opinion is divided. Some believe that with a bit of diplomatic skill China can be integrated into the existing international system without causing destabilization (Ikenberry, Shambaugh). Others are far less sanguine (Friedberg). The pessimists often compare China’s rise with that of Wilhelmine Germany. More specifically, the Anglo-German naval race is sometimes seen as foreshadowing Sino-US naval rivalry. In this analogy, today’s South China Sea, characterised by competing maritime claims, is the strategic equivalent of the North Sea at the beginning of the last century.
Taking advantage of its economic rise, China is understandably eager to expand its bluewater navy in order to be able to secure sea lanes given its rising dependence on trade and especially commodity imports. After all, eighty percent of China's crude oil imports pass through the South China Sea, as does the bulk of its merchandise trade. It is not difficult to see why China’s neighbours are similarly interested in the South China Sea. For instance, two-thirds of South Korea's energy supplies and nearly 60 percent of Japan's and Taiwan's energy supplies also pass through the South China Sea.
The US is a close ally of many countries bordering the South China Sea and its navy has been dominating the world’s oceans since the end of WWII. China’s increasing naval capabilities are perceived as a potential threat not just by US allies in the region, but also by the US navy. In an attempt to re-assure US regional allies and ensure US naval dominance, the Obama administration announced a so-called pivot into Asia with the goal of moving 60 percent of US naval assets into the Pacific by 2020, up from 50% today. Diplomatically, the US administration even went as far as declaring that the resolution of maritime disputes in the South China Sea was in the ‘US national interest’, while Beijing opposes the internationalisation of the issue and refers to South China Sea as a ‘core interest’ (alongside Taiwan and Tibet).
Intensified naval competition is not inevitable, but it won’t be easy to avoid it, either. The US (and its allies) perceives the Chinese naval build-up as a potential threat (or challenge, at least). China’s claim to the entire South China Sea, whatever its historical-legal merit, does nothing to alleviate concerns. By responding with its pivot, Washington feeds Beijing’s perception in terms of US attempts to ‘box it in’ and thus prevent the rise of Chinese naval power. This will almost inevitably encourage Beijing to increase its naval capabilities. And so on.
The opposing logics that affect, if not determine, Chinese and US policies are perhaps best illustrated by the following quote by a US analyst: “It is in the South China Sea that the components of Asia’s changing power dynamics are most concentrated and on display: China’s growing strategic heft and paranoid sense of entitlement (…) and the United States’ compulsion to meet China’s strategic challenge.” Interchange ‘China’ with ‘United States’ (and drop the word ‘growing’) and you might just get a sense of what the situation may look like when viewed from Beijing rather than Washington.
The situation is more complex that suggested here. Domestic political dynamics, the existence of oil and gas reserves and historical animosities further complicate the situation. Ultimately, however, the South China Sea issue is of massive geo-strategic significance to both China and the US and its allies. Developments in the South China Sea will provide a bellwether not just in terms of the intra-regional security dynamics, but also in terms of shifts in the broader Sino-US balance-of-power.
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| Source: DoD |