Much of mainstream IR theory is underpinned by 'material' (in a broad sense) concepts such as power, interest and rationality. While 'ideational' concepts like ideas, perception and beliefs occasionally feature in IR theories (or at least middle-range theories), 'softer' meaning- and Verstehen-related concepts generally get short shrift, at least as far grand theories are concerned. Hermeneutics, semiotics and linguistics typically don’t feature much in IR theory. This is in part a reflection of the dominance of positivism at the methodological level and the centrality of realism and neo-liberal institutionalism at the theoretical level (at least in the US). While other disciplines experienced a “linguistic turn”, mainstream IR theory remained largely wedded to traditional concepts such as power and interest. Thucydides would no doubt recognise this mode of analysis. Interestingly, Thucydides does mention “fear, honor and greed” as underpinning international politics. While fear (realism) and greed (economic gain) remain part and parcel of realism and neo-liberalim institutionalism, honor features only rarely in contemporary IR theory these days (O'Neill 2001), while social-constructivist approaches are the exception that prove the rule (Wendt 1999).
And yet symbols, images and languages are ubiquitous features of at the very least the practice of international politics – though this does not necessarily mean that they are explanatorily relevant. A French president and German chancellor holding hands at military cemetery; Japanese prime ministers visiting a shrine; poppies being worn in the UK to commemorate the Great War; the Genbaku Dome in Hiroshima and the Gedächtniskirche in Berlin; the Vietnam memorial in DC; the tomb of the unknown soldier in Paris; verbal apologies for past misdeeds; the good-and-evil rhetoric before sending young men and women into combat. Symbols, images and language can only function in the context of socially constructed, shared meaning, culture and social identity. Admittedly, some IR sub-disciplines like foreign policy analysis have paid some attention to such issues as perception, beliefs and meaning (Khong 1992), certainly more so than traditional grand theories have.
Foreign policy speeches often make extensive use of symbols, images and rhetorical devices. To the extent that speeches seek to communicate and to persuade, they appeal to emotions (pathos), values (ethos) and reason (logos). Symbols and images play a greater role in speeches appealing to ethos and pathos rather than in logos. That certainly is the case for speeches given on momentous and historically significant occasions as well as on occasions when public mobilization and rallying support take priority over information sharing.
The more memorable foreign policy speeches (not surprisingly) appeal to ethos and pathos - more so than to logos. Pericles' funeral oration (440 BC) primarily appeals to ethos. Queen Elizabeth I's speech at Tilbury (1588), in anticipation of the Spanish invasion, does so, too (with a little bit of pathos added in). Henry V's (fictionalised) St. Crispin's Day speech (1415) before the battle of Agincourt [thank you Shakespeare] appeals to ethos and pathos, while Otto von Bismarck's Blut und Eisen speech (1862) arguably inclines more to logos and pathos. Winston Churchill’s war-time speeches (Finest Hour, Fight on the Beaches and Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat [all 1940]) are a mixture of ethos and pathos and very little logos. (This is of course a very common feature of wartime speeches when mobilisation and support are the name of the game.) Churchill’s post-WWII Iron Curtain (1946) speech was more a mixture of ethos and logos. Last but not least, Jospeh Goebbel's Total War (1943) speech is one of the more extreme pathos-oriented speeches in the history of international politics, in addition to being one of the most infamous ones.
Momentous US foreign policy speeches also often tilt towards pathos and ethos. George Washington’s farewell address, warning the young United States of Foreign Entanglements (1796), appealed significantly to logos and ethos, while Woodrow Wilson’s idealist Make the World Safe for Democracy (1917) speech relied above all on ethos. FDR’s post-Pearl Day of Infamy (1941) address, at a time when the US was under attack, not surprisingly appealed to pathos and ethos (in that order), not logos.
Eisenhower’s warning about the Military-Industrial Complex (1961) in his farewell address inclined towards logos. JFK’s uplifting inaugural Bear any Burden (1961) address and the equally uplifting Ich bin ein Berliner (1963) speech, by contrast, appealed primarily to ethos. More somber and questioning, John Kerry’s Last Man to Die for a Mistake (1971) testimony before Congress is measured and relies on logos (as befits congressional testimony). Under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, major foreign policy speeches relied on ethos and pathos, as befits an actor-turned-politician and a president seeking to reenergise a United States suffering from Vietnam War related trauma and self-doubt. Reagan’s Evil Empire (1983) and Tear Down this Wall (1987) speeches were effective performances in this sense.
Rhetoric and language arguably became more measured again towards and especially after the end of the Cold War. Under the presidencies of George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton, logos and ethos dominated major foreign policy speeches, less so pathos. Bush presided over the end of the Cold War and arguably resisted rhetorical triumphalism. This changed again under George Bush Jr. when US confronted a renewed security threat in the form of post-9/11 terrorism. Not surprisingly, the Axis of Evil (2002) address sought to cast world politics in black-and-white terms (“You are with us or against us”). Perhaps because of the questionable logic underpinning the case for war against Iraq (and the other “rogue states”), the US decided to rely on pathos and ethos. Under Obama, things turned once again more measured. The present administration has not delivered any memorable foreign policy speeches, America First speeches at the UN general assembly excepted. This may be a reflection of a lack of a broader strategy as well as the fact that trade conflict does not lend itself easily to producing memorable foreign policy speeches.
These random comments and observations are not meant to amount to a theory. (It is quite possible that especially US presidential speeches are in part a reflection of a president’s personality and style as well as their circumstances and related objectives.) The observations are only meant to make the point that symbols, pathos, meaning and so on are ubiquitous international politics. The fact that they rarely feature in IR theories (again: foreign policy analysis, deterrence/ coercion excepted) may be due to their more limited explanatory relevance compared to factors such as power and interest. It may also be due to the fact that meaning-related terms are less readily operationalizable and quantifiable making it more difficult to incorporate them into broader theories. Food for thought …. and a topic for future research?