The history of the world is but the biography of great men, Thomas Carlyle wrote. Carlyle allowed for the possibility that the great men were guided by divine inspiration. Carlyle was heavily influenced by German idealism and Hegel, of course, famously thought he had seen the world spirit on a horseback when he saw Napoleon. ‘Great men history’ allow for a very narrow analytical focus. It is also a bit of a misnomer, as by no means all great or consequential people were men. Think of Cleopatra or Elizabeth I. More sensibly, Karl Marx pointed out: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past”. It is perhaps best left to Marxist scholars to figure out this statement can be squared with the view (or assumption) that the history is the history of class struggle. But the quote makes an important point. As far as international politics is concerned, it is rarely very interesting to understand a state’s behaviour from the point of view of great men (or women) without incorporating the ‘circumstances’ under which states operate.
Waltzian neo-realism emphasises the crucial importance of the international state system for the explanation of state behaviour. Neo- or structural realism shares many similarities with the microeconomic concept of (perfect) market competition (Waltz 1979). A perfectly competitive market means that all firms are price-takers and if they fail to withstand competition, they go out of business. Markets need not be perfectly competitive. Some markets are oligopolistic (great powers) and others monopolistic (empire). In the same way the market structure shapes the behaviour of companies, the international state system shapes the behaviour of states. The anarchical structure of the international state system means that states have to take care of their own security (self-help system). If states fail to do so, they may fail to survive – or at least they stop being a great power. In extremis, states suffer extinction. Empires tend to subdue other states and incorporate them into their system of rule or governance structure. But empires are not required for states to vanish from the map. While Poland succumbed to its imperial neighbours in the late 18th century, East Germany succumbed to non-imperial West Germany two centuries later. Historically, many empires and civilisations have disappeared, but not necessarily and not predominantly due to inter-state competition (Diamond 1997, Harper 2018).
Universal empire (or world government) has historically been impossible to establish. A somewhat competitive state system was operative throughout most of history. Quasi-universal empires emerged in certain parts of the world (e.g. China, Rome), but even they faced competition over the long run and, on one way or another, succumbed to rival states or (non-state) military competition. The failure to establish such an empire that would have subverted the anarchical state system was perhaps due to the logistic limits of political control (e.g. horse speed), centrifugal forces and/ or other states’ counter-balancing behaviour. The competitive (non-imperial) structure of the European international system has also been credited with European states’ emergence as world-conquering powers (Kennedy 1987). Political and military competition also made a major contribution to the rise of the modern, sovereign nation-state (Giddens 1985, Tilly 1992). Moreover, peace, war and stability has been linked to the structure of the international system with bipolarity typically seen as creating greater stability and certain types of multi-polarity increasing the risk of war (Waltz 1964, Deutsch & Singer 1964, Mearsheimer 2001). One does not need to be completely convinced of the veracity of these accounts in order to accept the import role the international system plays in states’ behaviour.
It is nevertheless equally difficult to deny that non-systemic factors are important. Nationalism undoubtedly often plays a role in the emergence of new states as well as the disappearance of existing states. At least, it seems to have done so in the past two centuries. The international system may be a major enabling or constraining factor on whether nationalism has an effect or not. After all, it was no coincidence that Poland re-emerged as a state after WWI, but Kurds, who seem themselves as a nation, have thus far failed to have a state of their own. At the same time, nationalism may affect the international systems by making it too costly to annex other states. Admittedly, there is also the post-1945 norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity that may have undermined great powers predilection for territorial expansion. Technology and economics may also matter in this respect. The point is that variables other than international state system have explanatory value. The international does matter, however. Does it matter in a way similar to role natural selection plays in biology?
What, if anything, has Charles Darwin’s model of evolution have to say about international politics?Darwinism offers an explanation of the origins of species and human descent. (Upon learning of Darwin’s claimthat man descended from apes, the Bishop of Worcester’s wife is to have said: “Let us hope it is not true. If it is, let us hope it will not be become generally known”. The story is likely apocryphal.) But equally importantly, it offered a framework for understanding a whole range of biological phenomena that hitherto had been difficult to account for – or at least difficult to account for in unified way. “Nothing in biology makes sense, except in light of evolution”, Theodosius Dobzhansky famously observed. If that is the case, the theory of evolution might should be expected to offer interesting insights in other areas of human inquiry. Indeed, evolutionary concepts have been applied with good success in – amongst other areas – linguistics, sociology, anthropology (obviously), ideas, fashion, even epistemology.
Karl Popper initially rejected Darwin’s theory of evolution as un-scientific. (He later changed his mind.) This is not the place to discuss what makes science ‘science’ – and Popper’s falsificationism has its share of problems, as do all other philosophical (rational-reconstructionist) accounts of science. Darwinism does propose interesting hypotheses about what underpins change, stability and survival. Whether the theory and related hypotheses are falsifiable in a strict sense is secondary as long as Darwinism is taken to be a heuristic tool. It is a theory that is logically consistent, fruitful in terms of implications and the empirical evidence is consistent with its validity in the biological realm (Walt 2001). It is true that the theory evolution provides ‘just-so-stories’, that is, an “untestable narrative explanation” (Gould & Lewontin 1979). But then, most history writing and no small part of the social sciences rely on what are ultimately narrative explanations (Jaeger 2020).
Darwinism is based on three fundamental assumptions (or mechanisms): (1) variation, which is random; (2) inheritance; and (3) natural selection, which is non-random. Natural selection leads to adaptation, that is, the ability to survive and reproduce (fitness). Differential reproductive success is a reflection of how well-adapted something is. It does however not automatically follow that all features of an organism are adaptations. And not all changes are due to natural selection. Genetic drift happens all the time (and tends to have a greater impact in smaller populations). It is difficult to prove that a specific trait is an adaptation or simply an “exaptation”. Exaptation can take the form of pre-adaptations or so-called spandrels. Pre-adaptation refers to an adaptation that later comes to fulfil a different function/ adaptation. A spandrel is simply a by-product of an adaptation that is itself not directly due to adaptive selection (Gould & Lewontin 1979).
Neo-Darwinism, by and large, incorporates genetics into the Darwinist framework. This represents a significant advance, but it has also led to Darwinism being selectively challenged by, for example, epigenetics and symbio-genesis. Darwinism is not so much a settled scientific theory, but a field of lively intellectual debt and scientific research. What is the unit natural selection selects on? Molecular structures, genes, epi-genes, cells, organisms (phenotypes), behaviour, groups, species? Darwinism does not allow for genetic ‘change’ during an individual’s lifespan, but epigenetics seems to be challenging this notion (up to a point) by allowing for changing gene activity and expression (but not alterations in the DNA sequence). Epigenetics also focuses on changes of phenotypical heritable traits. Epigenetics suggest that inheritance and specifically the role played by genes in terms of heritable phenotypical traits is more complicated, including at the ‘cellular’ level. is where it becomes complicated, including conceptually. One’s own behaviour and even our ancestors’ experiences may at least affect the way genes are expressed. Is Lamarckism staging a comeback? In addition to Lamarckism, orthogenesis (innate drive for change) and saltationism (massive sudden mutations) offer distinctly non-Darwinian accounts of evolutionary change. They are widely rejected in biology these days, but may offer frameworks that provide interesting insights in other areas of social inquiry. Last but not least, there is the issue of gradual vs rapid change within a broadly Darwinian framework (Gould 2007). Whether or not these approaches offer good explanations of biological phenomena is secondary for our purposes. Primarily, they offer theoretically interesting and somewhat neglected ways to think about international politics.
So how epistemically useful is Darwinism (and other accounts of biological change) as a framework for thinking about international politics? At one level, the attempt to appropriate Darwinism appears deeply problematic. Variation and reproduction as mechanisms do not seem apply in the case of international politics. Variation is not random and reproduction in the sense of generating new organisms is, at best, extremely rate in international politics. Variation happens, although in a much less random fashion, and the persistence of a state that experiences significant changes in its domestic characteristics may perhaps be interpreted as reproduction in a very broad sense. Of course, Darwinian variation is blind and it does not (or is not supposed to) take place within the lifespan of a single organism. But perhaps variation and reproduction can be appropriated in a loose way. States experience non-random, because generally purposeful changes of their domestic characteristics, while reproduction might be interpreted as (continuous) survival over time. Perhaps a bit of a stretch, but let’s whether this is epistemically interesting.
Natural selection appears to be a very relevant concept. The international state system can help account for characteristics or behavioural traits as adaptation or selection pressure. Certain traits of a state can be interpreted as adaptations. And unlike in the case of biology, the historical record may make the question of whether a specific trait is an adaptation (rather than exaptation) easier to settle. Most states have armies. Epigenetics might also be re-purposed. If one regards a certain historical-collective experience as an adaptation, then maybe, just maybe a recent experience may lead the experience being activated or “expressed”. Russia experienced foreign aggression in two world wars and during the post-WWII Western intervention in the Russian civil war. After having acquired a long-range nuclear arsenal, the USSR may have felt more secure than Imperial Russia or the Stalinist USSR. But may, just maybe a deteriorating geopolitical position after the demise of the USSR led to the expression of existing genes, that is, the Russian state (incl. security apparatus or siloviki). Maybe Lamarckism or simply Waltz’s structural realism offer less contrived ways of accounting for the same phenomenon. The goal is not so much to offer the ‘best’ explanation but to explore how epistemically interesting Darwinian concepts are when applied to international politics.
The concept of punctuated equilibrium is also very interesting (Gould 2007). In fact, the concept, in addition to path dependence, was appropriated by historical institutionalists a long time ago. After all, states typically do not and cannot re-invent themselves completely. Path dependence constrains certain developmental paths and makes certain outcome virtually impossible. An economically backward country will not, cannot transform itself into an economically and technologically advanced country overnight. The domestic DNA limits the range of short-term and perhaps even long-term outcomes. Adaptationist pressure may do the same. In order to remain a great power, certain reforms may be necessary. Domestic instability may weaken the international position of a state and knock them out of great power competition. But an adaptationist logic, perhaps, leads many of them to re-emerge much strengthened (e.g. Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany, post-Mao China more gradually). Historical institutionalism is, after all, a kind of functionalism and incudes other concepts like critical junctures and system concepts like feedback and returns to scale (Pierson 2000, 2004). Again, changes may be very purposeful (non-random) from the start (e.g. Meiji Restoration, Prussian post-Napoleonic reforms). Not only were they a direct response to international selection pressures. But successful reform was conditioned on the existence of favourable domestic institutional and ideational characteristics (e.g. efficient bureaucracy, [arguably] militaristic ideology) whose absence may have precluded successful domestic reform and international rise.
Last but certainly not least, if the nature of environmental pressure changes, different adaptations are bound emerge. The Hobbesian conditions of the 1930s favoured states with strong military forces, while the relatively peaceful ‘western’ post-WII order ultimately selected for economic success. In other words, trading states could thrive in a way that they could not have in the 1930s. Germany and Japan became trading states thanks to reduced external military pressure under the US security blanket. If the world is again becoming more Hobbesian, then both Japan and Germany are maladapted. Think Japanese constitution or Germany’s foreign trade dependence. Success defined less as survival but as survival as a ‘great power’ will force them to adapt to increased security competition. If they do not, they will not ‘survive as great powers’. Fitness, loosely defined, varies with changing environmental pressures.
A short comment like this cannot do justice to the manifold ways a theory as rich as Darwin’s theory of evolution (and its cousins) may usefully inform our understanding of international politics. Darwinian concepts do not apply one-to-one to international politics. But Darwinian (and related) ideas deserve greater attention and should become part of the analytical tool box of international relations scholars and international affairs analysts. Granted, the concepts may feel abstract, that is, too far removed from the familiar, interest- and power-oriented analysis of day-to-day international politics. (Then, of course, all concepts are abstract.) But abstraction is interesting precisely because it forces analysts look at the world from a different, unfamiliar angle and on the of differentness familiar premises. This often proves very fruitful, even if the higher degree of abstraction does not generate precise or even accurate predictions and even if it leaves 'under-explained' phenomena it is supposed to be able to explain. Darwinian (and related) concepts and theory may at first appear to be too abstract and too impractical to have be of practical relevance in international politics. Nevertheless, the suggest and point to a higher-level logic that cannot but enrich more pedestrian, down-to-earth, day-to-day analysis as well as our broader understanding of international politics..