A third-image explanation can account for why Sino-US competition has arisen and why it is here to stay (Waltz 1959). It so happens that domestic-level factors in both the US and China also point towards continuing and intensified competition.
Conflicting strategic objectives
For more than a century, US grand strategy has consisted of preventing the emergence of a hegemonic power on either side of the Eurasian landmass. The emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe or East Asia would have the potential to threaten US security and it might lead to the economic exclusion of the US from major overseas markets. Whenever a state threatened to dominate Europe or East Asia, the US ended up going to war. This was the case in WWI, WWII and the Cold War.
China, on the other hand, considers the extensive US military presence and US alliances in Asia a potential threat to its security as well as its domestic political stability. China’s increasing integration into the international economy over the past four decades has translated into increased dependence on overseas trade, creating hitherto non-existing economic and political vulnerabilities, particularly with respect to strategic, essential imports like energy. Not surprisingly, China is eager to mitigate these vulnerabilities (e.g. BRI, blue water navy, RCEP) and, thanks to its economic rise, it is now in a position to increasingly contest the US military presence in Asia. China sees the US presence in the region as providing Washington with the means to destabilize China, economically and politically, while China’s increasing power and assertiveness have the US worried about its own strategic position in East Asia. In short, conflicting strategic interests and a classic security dilemma strongly favor Sino-US competition, if not confrontation.
Increasing security and economic competition
China’s military modernization is increasingly challenging the US position in Asia. In addition to its investment in asymmetric capabilities, China’s maritime strategy of “near seas defense and far seas protection” as well as the construction of a blue water navy is not surprisingly considered a threat by Washington. But the construction of a blue water navy to defend sea lanes is only logical given China’s increased dependence on international trade. So is its so-called string of pearls policy that is meant to support China’s international trade and sea lane protection. Meanwhile, US military doctrine and concepts such as offshore control heightens Chinese security concerns about open sea access and chokepoints. Beijing is challenging the territorial and especially maritime status quo in the East and South East China Sea in order to push out its security perimeter. In other words: China and the US confront a classic security dilemma.
It is not surprising that security competition has spilled over into the economic and technological realm, undermining further any residual trust that may have existed between China and the US. Washington has not been shy about weaponizing economic interdependence by, for example, limiting Chinese access to key US technologies or imposing tariffs on Chinese imports. Being in the weaker position, China’s response has been relatively muted (or proportional). But it has spurred China to address the risks and vulnerabilities arising from economic interdependence through diversification (e.g. EU-China investment treaty), regional economic integration (RCEP, BRI) and greater emphasis on indigenous economic and technological capabilities (e.g. Made in China 2025, “dual circulation”). All of these policies aim to reduce China’s economic-technological vulnerability in the context of intensifying Sino-US security competition. Technological competition has kicked into full gear and both sides are proactively seeking to limit their dependence on each other in terms of other critical goods (e.g. rare earth, semiconductors). Security competition is negatively affecting bilateral economic relations. High politics beats low politics.
US domestic attitudes towards China have hardened
Only a little more than a decade ago, senior US government officials were hoping that China – benefitting from the existing international economic and political order – would emerge as “responsible stakeholder”. It was believed (or hoped) that economic modernization would lead to domestic political liberalization, which – via democratic peace theory – might in turn allow China to rise peacefully. This has not come to pass.
In fact, it is next to impossible to find any senior government official, member of congress or think tank policy wonk in Washington today who is not a China hawk. For a start, virtually all the Biden administration officials occupying senior position in the national security and economic realm are firmly critical of China. This is not surprising. Most of them served in the Obama administration and experienced first-hand how the US-China relationship deteriorated. In particular, President Xi reneging on his 2015 promise to President Obama not to militarize the disputed artificial islands in the South China Sea is often cited as a wake-up call. Then again, ultimately the drivers of competition are structural.
Biden administration officials are not ideological China bashers, in spite of the administration’s renewed emphasis on a value-based US foreign policy. They accept strategic competition as a fact of life but strive for “competition without catastrophe”. They also believe that it is necessary to engage and seek cooperation with China in selected areas (e.g. climate, public health), but they accept that the overall relationship is and will remain competitive, even adversarial. Across the administration, across the Washington political class and across the think tank world, there is virtual unanimity with respect to the need to compete with, and even confront, China.
Not only is a hawkish China policy one of the very issues that commands bipartisan support of the political class these days. But, according to Pew Research, public opinion is also taking an increasingly negative view of China. A recent Pew poll showed that ¾ of Americans have a negative view of China. Although some of the negative polling is due to the pandemic, popular opinion is unambiguously anti-China. Few elections will be won by being “soft” on China. Corporate America has –if not turned against China – become more China-skeptical. Limited access to the Chinese markets, Chinese industrial, competition and technology policies disadvantaging foreign companies and, more generally, greater Chinese competitiveness has led many (but not all) sectors to become wearier of China. US domestic grievances abound. In short, both international-systemic factors and domestic political dynamics point to a more competitive and hawkish US China policy.