The enduring influence of geography on international politics (2020)

In The Course of German History (1945), the always enjoyable, eminently readable, if controversial AJP Taylor writes: “The Germans are the people of the north European plain, the people without a defined natural frontier (…). There is no determined geographic point for German expansion, equally none for German contraction; and, in the course of a thousand years, geographic Germany has gone out and in like a concertina. (…) Every German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent; that is the permanence of German geography”. Compared to (some) historians (Braudel 1940), IR theorists do not have much to say about geography, at least not in a systematic way. IR scholarship has not produced a general theory of how geography affects international politics. The field of International Security Studies does incorporate geography into its analyses, but it does so in a rather ad-hoc manner. 

Geography played a more prominent role in debates about international politics during the latter half of the 19th and the early 20th century, especially in the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder. Mahan regarded the ‘control of the sea’ as the key to national power and geography was an important factor underpinning sea power. By contrast, MacKinder discounted the importance of sea power and argued in favour of the ‘geographical pivot of history’. Control of the ‘heartland’ allows for control of the ‘world-island (broadly: Eurasia), allows for control of the world. Nicolas Spykman and Rudolf Kjellen continued to do work in the Mahan-MacKinder tradition during the first half of the 20th century. But during the second half of the 20thcentury, such grand geo-political theorising went out of fashion in part due to its association with Nazi Germany’s programme of territorial conquest (Karl Haushofer, Friedrich Ratzel). Books and articles about geography and geopolitics continue to be written (Brzezinski 1997, Kaplan 2012), but they typically focus on case-oriented analysis (US, China) and rarely provide a broader conceptual framework for understanding how geography impacts international relations. While the theories of Mahan and Mackinder might be too ‘grand’ for today’s more policy-oriented tastes, the absence of middle-range theories of  international politics that incorporate geography is noteworthy.

Geography does feature more prominently in the sub-field of security studies. The security dilemma is a function of technological, political as well as geographic factors (Jervis 1978). The military offence-defence balance is a key determinant of the severity of the security dilemma (Fearon 1997). Geographic proximity of the main belligerents, combined with a tight-knit alliance system and military deployment plans and railroad timetables, created an explosive mix in the decade prior to the outbreak of WWI (Schroeder 2004). All other things equal, geographically adjacent land powers find it more difficult to avoid military conflict, especially if the offence-defence balance is (perceived to be) tilted in favour of the former (Van Evera 1994). Rival sea powers typically face a less severe security dilemma. Naval encounters can be more easily avoided (fleet-in-being) and naval power is more difficult to project. Arguably, the consequences of a naval defeat are not as severe as defeat on land. Rivalry between two relatively distant sea powers may be easier to defuse (Schake 2017), compared to adjacent land powers. Geography may be less applicable to nuclear war fought with ICBMs or cyber war fought in the ether. Nonetheless, geography remains relevant to conventional war. Power projection over great distances remains difficult. Extended lines of communication are vulnerable to enemy interference (Biddle & Oelrich 2016). Jomini and Clausewitz would easily recognise the contemporary landscape of conventional warfare.

Geo-politics, geography and strategy are closely interconnected. Geography features more prominently in military strategy than in International Relations theory. Geopolitics is pre-occupied with the effect of geography on international politics. Geography is the study of the physical features of the earth and the atmosphere as well as of human activity to the extent that it is affected by or affects geography. Frederick Jackson Taylor’s frontier theory and Montesquieu’s meteorological climate theory are examples of how geography features prominently in other disciplines. Economists and economic historians have also produced a substantial body of work exploring how geography, climatic conditions and resource endowment affect economic development (Sachs & Warner 1995, Pomeranz 2001).

Geo-strategy is the study of how geography informs, constrains and affects foreign and defence policy. The US Naval War College defines strategy as the “process by which political purpose is translated into military action”. Strategy thus defined is closely related to operations and tactics. Geo-strategy, by comparison, is more closely related to what is called grand strategy, albeit with a more explicit focus on geography. Grand strategy can be defined as “an integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies. It is the conceptual framework that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there; it’s the theory, or logic, that guides leaders seeking security in a complex and insecure world” (Brands 2014). Geography is one of several important factors affecting a state’s interest, threats, resources and, ultimately, its policies. Again, geography does occasionally feature in the work of international relations scholars (Mearsheimer & Walt 2016). But it rarely does so in a systematic as opposed to an ad-hoc manner. In spite of a lack of middle-range theories of international politics that explicitly incorporate geography, geography matters. 

Britain’s island geography was a crucial pre-condition for establishing naval supremacy and for building a vast overseas empire. Unlike its continental European neighbours, Britain did not have to invest in a large standing army to defend the realm and instead could concentrate its military spending on its navy, allowing it to both ensure its territorial integrity at relatively low cost and to expand overseas. Geography also allowed Britain to remain relatively aloof with respect to European politics (‘splendid isolation') and gave it much greater diplomatic flexibility by allowing it to act as an ‘offshore balancer’. German historiography used to refer to Prussia as Britain’s continental sword (Festlandsdegen). Palmerston memorably spoke of Britain not having eternal allies nor perpetual enemies, just perpetual interests. Diplomatic flexibility was facilitated by Britain’s island geography. Last but not least, the existence of large coal reserves helped fuel the industrial revolution that established Britain as the world’s pre-eminent economic power, which in turn allowed it to build the world’s most powerful navy and “rules the waves”. 

Germany’s geographic location was a important factor affecting Prussian and later German foreign policy and military strategy. As AJP Taylor pointed out, Germany did not have fixed frontiers in the West or East and this did contribute to recurrent territorial expansion and contraction. Its geographic location also influenced its defence policy and strategy, including the ill-fated Schlieffen plan (Citino 2005). Prussia and later Germany, as relatively resource- and/ or space-constrained states, could not rely on anything resembling defence-in-depth or afford to engage in wars of attrition, not least because its geographic location often raised the spectre of a multi-front war. Military strategy from Frederick the Great to Nazi Germany reflected geographic and geopolitical reality. Voltaire described Prussia as army with a state. That can also be explained by Prussia’s exposed location. Similar to Britain, Prussia’s and later Germany’s geo-political rise was also in no small part due to the existence of ample coal deposits in Silesia and later the Ruhr.

Geography is only one factor among several that influences international politics. The multi-causal nature of important international events makes it difficult to generate a broader geographic theory of international relations. To the extent that the focus is on great power politics, scholars face a degree-of-freedom problem. Instead International Relations has been more concerned with agency and the structure of the state system (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979). But counterfactual thought experiments quickly establish geography as an important factor affecting many aspects of international politics. Britain would not have ruled the waves, had it not been for its island geography. Prussia would not have upset the European balance-of-power, had it not had access to abundant coal (and steel). Russia and the USSR would have succumbed to the Napoleonic and Hitlerite invasions, had it not benefitted from strategic depth. Neither island geography, natural resource endowment nor geographic depth on their own explain Britain’s naval supremacy, Germany’s geo-political rise or Russia’s military survival. But there is no denying that geography was a key factor in all these developments and events. Geography is a basic yet often crucial fact of international political life. 

Geography affects strategy, strategic culture and strategic rivalry. Pericles, for example, advocated a “grand strategy of indirect approach” (Liddell-Hart 1967). By virtue of being a sea power, Athens was not in a position to confront Sparta on land. It let the Spartan army raid Attica every year, while the Athenians launched naval raids into Sparta’s rear areas. Unsurprisingly, British military theorists and strategists (Corbett, Liddell-Hart) generally advocated the “indirect approach” more often than their ‘land power’ counterparts in continental Europe (Jomini, Clausewitz). This is not to suggest that naval power cannot be deployed in ‘decisive encounters’ (Mahan) as opposed to using naval power in more limited and indirect ways (Corbett). But to the extent that naval powers have smaller land forces, they often have no choice but to opt for an indirect approach (e.g. Spanish peninsula/ Napoleonic Wars, British Expeditionary Force/ WWI). Geography also affects the nature of strategic rivalries (Colaresi 2008). The fact that Athens (whale) was a sea power and Sparta (elephant) a land power mattered not just in terms of how the war was conducted. It also bore on its conclusion. It was only when Sparta (with Persia’s help) successfully managed to challenge Athens at sea and destroy its hitherto dominant navy that the Peloponnesian War finally came to an end.

The major strategic conflicts and rivalries of the past century offer themselves to a broadly  Mackinderian reading. At the geo-strategic level, World War I was about preventing German hegemony over the European continent. World War II was about foiling German’s second attempt to bring Europe, the western end of the Eurasian land mass, under its control as well as about preventing Japan from dominating East and South-East Asia. The Cold War was about preventing Soviet hegemony over Europe. China-US rivalry is about the US preventing China from dominating continental and maritime East Asia and South-East Asia. US foreign policy has always sought to prevent either side of the Eurasian land mass from falling under the hegemony of a single, rival state (Campbell 2016). Quote MacKinder: “Who rules the heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world”.

Geography continues to inform the US strategy towards Asia and China. The US presence in East Asia is the legacy of the Spanish-American War and WWII. So is the US hub-and-spokes alliance model (Cha 2016). The US does not have territorial claims and acts as the guarantor of the status quo. The combination of territorial non-contiguity and status quo defence leads the US to be perceived as less of a threat by regional states than China (except by China). China, on the other hand, finds its more difficult to manage threat perception. This is in part due to China’s assertive revisionism, but also because of its geographic proximity. Moreover, the US finds itself in an enviable geographic position. The US faces Canada to the North and Mexico to the South. The US navy is in firm control of all maritime approaches to North America. In fact, it controls the global commons (Posen 2003), though control is gradually being challenged by China (US Department of Defense 2019). Leaving aside vulnerability to ICBMs and cyberwarfare, the US home base is extremely secure. 

By comparison, China’s geographic and geo-political position is quite vulnerable. In geographic terms, most of China’s industrial base is concentrated on the eastern seaboard. In geo-economic terms, China’s access to international markets relies on access to the seas but its seaboard faces two island chains that are largely controlled by the US and its allies. These geographic barriers can quickly be turned into geo-strategic barriers. They also hamper China’s naval deployments and may make overseas sea lane protection difficult. Moreover, China has no formal alliances. Its main partners are Cambodia, Laos and North Korea, while it shares land or maritime borders with a host of of potential or actual competitors, including Japan, South Korea, India, Russia as well as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – and further afield Australia. Most of China’s neighbours are formally or informally allied to United States and benefit from an explicit or implicit security guarantee. This leaves China with an unpalatable choice: accept its geographic vulnerability or seek to reduce it but antagonise its neighbours and the US. By building a blue water navy, China may be repeating the mistake Imperial Germany made when it began building a fleet to challenge the British navy (Luttwak 2012, Xu 2016). Geography matter greatly.

Geography also affects US and Chinese military doctrine and strategy. China has moved from coastal defence to “active defense” (or offshore waters defense) and is beginning to shift to open seas protection. This is a reflection of China’s increasing wealth and its increased dependence on international trade. Geographic and geopolitical realities shape these military strategy. The US is increasingly concerned about Chinese asymmetric capabilities, especially in the seas around China bt stretching all the way out to the second island chain. The present stand-off (island building vs freedom of navigation) is over anti-access and area-denial in the near seas. The US is also toying with other strategies, including the Air-Sea battle concepts (deterrence by punishment), offshore control (deterrence by punishment) and deterrence by denial (Torsvoll 2015) that are similarly conditioned by geography. Geography affects available military options and it is bound to affect how the US will counter China’s rise. Projecting power across the Pacific and with US military bases in the region becoming more vulnerable as Chinese military capabilities improve, the US will likely be forced to rely on strengthening its security alliances and arrangements in the region rather than increase its military assets significantly. US financial constraints point in the same direction, in spite of the Obama administration's "pivot".

Geography is not destiny, of course. Germany's geographic position did not change between 1871 and 1914, but its geopolitical position deteriorated sharply. Increasingly siding with Austria-Hungary against Russia proved a mistake. (This is not the place to analyse whether it was an avoidable mistake.) By 1914, Imperial Germany had tethered itself to weakening Austria-Hungary, had annoyed rising Russia and agonised Britain. This was not due to geography but due to geopolitical choices that might have been avoided. Present-day Germany is surrounded by economic partners and military allies. The central geographic position that previously left it geo-politically and militarily vulnerable (including during the Cold War) now provides security and economic opportunity. That said, one may make the argument that Russia's foreign policy has not changed much over the past century or so, even though the domestic political regime changed several times. Geography may not be destiny and but its effect may may outweigh domestic politics. Only because the “politics” in geo-politics matters does not mean that the “geo” does not matter. It is just that IR scholars focus more (explicitly) on the “politics” than the “geo”.

Geography does not determine international politics. Rather together with other factors it shapes the risks and opportunities states face. As such, it does affect states’ diplomatic-political options and informs states’ military strategies. Geography shaped and continues to shape international politics in enduring, if complex ways.

Biases, heuristics & statistics - a guide for foreign policy makers (2020)

The so-called availability heuristic may help explain Anthony Eden’s fateful decision to invade the Suez Canal zone in 1956. The heuristic itself was derived from an historical analogy. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Nasser was likened to Hitler’s decision to remilitarise the Rhineland twenty years earlier. (Eden, it is worth remembering, had resigned from the cabinet in 1938 over Chamberlain’s appeasement policy.) The rise of Nazi Germany and Britain’s failure to oppose it was the defining experience of policy makers of Eden’s generation. The “ghost of Munich” continued to loom large in their minds even after Nazi Germany had been defeated. “For Nasser read Hitler, and it’s all very familiar”, Harold Macmillan, Eden’s successor as prime minister, scribbled on a Foreign Office telegram more than seven years after the Suez Crisis. The formative experience of the failure of Britain’s appeasement policy provided the basis for an historical analogy and a related availability heuristic: confront nationalist strongmen set on revising the territorial status quo immediately, or else. This heuristic may have informed Eden’s ill-fated decision to confront Nasser.

Images, symbols, heuristics and historical analogies are powerful but somewhat underappreciated factors in international politics. Neville Chamberlain waving a piece of paper proclaiming “peace of our time” upon his return from Munich became an iconic image in its own right as well as a symbol of the folly of pursuing a policy of accommodation towards a rising, ruthless, revisionist state. The piece of paper came to symbolise the harsh reality that international agreements are not worth the piece of paper they are written on. The lesson (and heuristic) derived from the failure of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy was that revisionist states must be confronted promptly. 

The meaning of images and symbols as well as the heuristics derived from historical precedent are not set in stone. Following WWII, Churchill emerged as the hero and Chamberlain as, at best, a tragic figure. This interpretation has become more nuanced since, as have the lessons learnt (Kennedy 1992). And sometimes the images and symbols themselves change. When the USSR was a vital ally of the United States in the fight against Nazi Germany, Joseph Stalin was referred to as Uncle Joe, that is, a nice, diminutive, benevolent elderly gentleman with a big moustache. When the Cold War got underway, the image of Uncle Joe turned from nice uncle to mass-murdering, cruel, atheist lunatic. 

Even if the interpretation of an historical event remains unchanged, it leaves unanswered the question which historical precedent is most applicable to a contemporary foreign policy problem. Eden likening Nasser to Hitler concluded that Nasser needed to be confronted right away. But Eden also occasionally used the Mussolini analogy and the Mussolini analogy may have suggested a different lesson and heuristic (Freedman & Michaels 2013). After all, Italy was not about invade Western Europe, threaten to launch an invasion of the British Isles, invade the USSR and seek hegemony over (continental) Europe. Neither was Nasser.

Historical analogies often serve as a source of heuristics that guide and inform foreign policy decisions (Khong 1992). An analogy is a correspondence of partial similarity. Historical analogies reduce complexity by focussing on crucial structural similarities between a historical event and a contemporary situation. Analogies typically disregard potentially important differences. They are often vague and suggestive, and they typically fail to say much about unexamined background conditions. Historical analogies allow policy makers to derive heuristics. It is not so much the heuristics that are debatable, and more whether the past and present case are similar enough to warrant the use of the heuristic. Historical analogies need to be used very judiciously, not least because ceteris paribus conditions rarely apply (May & Neustadt 1996).

Historical analogies can also be used (or abused) to justify and advocate foreign policy decisions (Khong 1992). The vagueness and implicitness of analogies allow decision-makers to use and abuse them for political marketing purposes. By emphasising one aspect or de-emphasising another aspect of an historical analogy, policy makers can make use of a wide range of analogies to justify their foreign policies – whether or not the analogy forms the basis for the actual decision or not. Historical analogies can also shape decision-makers’ cognitive landscape and – wittingly or unwittingly – influence their decisions. See Suez. In practice, it can be difficult to establish whether an analogy (and related heuristic) was used as a device to persuade or as an instrument to inform a foreign policy decision. 

What exactly are images, biases, heuristics and historical analogies? Images and symbols are often suggestive, and they are a focal point of shared meaning. (The meaning attached to images and symbols may vary between groups.) Biases are systemic deviations from the standard of rationality in judgment or decision. They can affect individuals as well as groups. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that allow for quick judgment and decisions in the face of complex problems. Though frequently violating the laws of logic and probability, they often produce “good enough” outcomes (Gigerenzer 2015). Last but not least, historical analogies can be defined as “a historical reference to a previous situation that is relevant to the current situation due to its similarity or contrast” (Axelrod & Forster 2016). Put more succinctly, “heuristics are the ‘shortcuts’ that humans use to reduce task complexity in judgment and choice, and biases are the resulting gaps between normative behaviour and the heuristically determined behaviour (Kahneman & Tversky 1982). Historical analogies are or can be sources of heuristics and related biases.

Ignoring the existence of heuristics and biases can lead to avoidable mistakes. Governments engage in a fair amount of conscious and intentional lying (or non-truth-telling, if you prefer) in foreign affairs, mainly toward their own population rather than their adversary (Mearsheimer 2011), often taking advantage of cognitive biases to persuade. But cognitive biases can also contribute to self-deception and lead to bad foreign policy decisions (e.g. Operation Barbarossa, Bay of Pigs, Suez, Vietnam). At a minimum, policy makers should be aware of how various biases and heuristics, including heuristics related to historical analogies, contribute to mistaken decisions. 

Admittedly, tying foreign policy decisions to biases and heuristics is not a straightforward exercise. For a start, an analyst can never know what was really going on in the minds of key decision-makers. What statesmen say cannot be taken at face value. Historical sources and documents are not necessarily reliable (Trachtenberg 2006). Memoirs often suffer from self-serving and hindsight biases (sic!). In practice, it can be difficult to tell whether a bias or a heuristic was actually operative in a specific situation. In this sense, examples that link foreign policy failure to heuristics and biases must remain suggestive. 

Eliminating cognitive biases and the flawed use of historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making does not mean that mistakes can be avoided altogether. Unbiased decisions may translate into adverse outcomes due to lack of information constraints, misperception, high risk tolerance, unpredictable strategic interaction effects and so on. Moreover, rational decision-making is not always possible or even optimal given the various constraints decision-makers face (Klein 1998). This is precisely why heuristics are so widely applied. Nonetheless, understanding the role biases, heuristics and analogies play in judgment and decisions helps improve the quality of decisions. Here is an example.

The need for cognitive closure can be a significant source of bias. The 2002 Iraq War is widely regarded as a major mistake, at the very least in the sense that the decision was based on optimistic assumptions about post-war political stability. Robert Jervis points out that people seek to avoid cognitive dissonance and painful value trade-offs. As it turns out, those who believed that regime change in Iraq was the right thing to do also believed that post-war reconstruction would prove easy. By contrast, those who opposed the Iraq war believed that it would be difficult to create a stable post-war government. Few people believed that regime change was desirable, but post-war stability would be difficult to establish. And few people believed that regime change was undesirable, but that post-war stability would be easy to establish. This strongly suggests (but does not prove) that the need for cognitive coherence and avoidance of dissonance was in play. A desire for cognitive closure and an avoidance of value trade-offs biased people’s assessment of how easy or difficult post-war stabilisation was going to be. Biases matter in real-world policy decisions. This is also demonstrated by the following (non-exhaustive) list of biases and heuristics and their potential influence on important past foreign policy decisions.

	What is it?	Why is it irrational?	Historical example
Sunk cost effect (related to loss aversion)	Tendency to persist in a course of action in order to recover the costs related to that action	Past losses should not matter. Escalation of commitment is irrational	US decision to prolong war in Vietnam
Loss aversion (related to endowment & IKEA effect)	Tendency to prefer avoiding losses to making gains	Impact of loss vs gain should be symmetrical	Militarily, defence (of one’s territory) stronger than attack (on other’s territory)?
Framing effect	Tendency to be influenced by how a choice is framed. Negative frame causes risk seeking (and vice versa)	Risk tolerance should not be a function of how a situation is presented	Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor (1941) when faced with the possible “loss” of China due to US pressure
Status quo bias (related to loss aversion)	Preference for things to stay the same	Makes one miss upside opportunities; makes one irrationally attached to status quo	United States defending the status quo in East Asia in the face of rising China
Anchoring	Over-reliance on an initial, arbitrary piece of information	Arbitrary information is of likely of limited relevance/ distorts available information	US Congress passing Gulf of Tonkin resolution (1964) after initial (but mistaken) news of Vietnamese attack on US destroyer
Recency bias (related to availability heuristics)	Tendency to attribute greater weight to more recent than less recent events	An event’s relevance does not typically depend on when it occurred	US policy towards Vietnam in light of recent “loss” of China to communism
Availability heuristics	Rely on immediate examples to make judgments	Only because something is easily recallable does not make it a relevant piece of information	Eden likening Nasser to Hitler and launching the occupation of the Suez Canal zone (1956)
Stereotyping (also ecological fallacy; related to outgroup bias)	Tendency to infer an individual’s attributes on the basis of group membership	Ignores variability of attributes in other group	WWII US propaganda vis-à-vis Japan/ Tojo (Dower 1986)
Fundamental attribution error (also: correspondence bias or attribution effect)	Under-emphasize situational explanations of others’ behaviour; over-emphasize dispositional behaviour; vice versa	Logically problematic to assume that others are driven by their “nature”, but one’s own actions are driven by circumstances	Soviet communism is inherently expansionary aka “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (Kennan/ X 1947)
Confirmation bias (related to: availability heuristics)	Tendency to search for, interpret and favour information that confirms one’s prior personal belief	Both confirming and disconfirming information are relevant from an evidentiary point of view	US government seeking information supporting Iraqi WMD programme (2001)
Belief bias (related to: confirmation bias)	Tendency to judge validity of a hypothesis on the basis of prior belief rather than logic that supports it	Evidence should determine the justified degree of belief in a hypothesis/ explanation	Stalin dismissing intelligence that Germany was about to invade the USSR (1941)
Avoidance of cognitive dissonance (not a bias strictly speaking, but least to biases; related to: confirmation bias)	Tendency to avoid having inconsistent thoughts and beliefs	Competing explanations may be equally well-supported by the evidence and neither can/ should be discarded	Supporters of Iraq war (2002) were unconcerned about post-war stability; opponents were very concerned (Jervis 2010)
Overconfidence effect  (related to: gambler’s fallacy and Dunn-Krueger effect)	Subjective confidence in one’s own judgment greater than objectively warranted	Confidence should be a reflection of available evidence and assessed independently of past performance	German confidence prior to invasion of the USSR (1941)
By-stander effect (not a bias strictly speaking)	Tendency of individuals not to help a victim if other people are present	May be rational from an economic point of view (=> logic of collective action)	Stresa Front & German remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 (Mearsheimer 2001)
Groupthink	Tendency of groups to make irrational decisions in order to minimise intra-group conflict	Often leads to relevant alternatives not being considered and decisions taken based on socio-psychological dynamics rather than evidence	JKF’s ill-fated decision to proceed with Eisenhower administration’s plans to invade the Bay of Pigs (1961) (Janis 1972)

Probability theory and statistics feature less prominently in foreign policy decisions and analysis. High-stakes foreign policy decisions in particular are unlikely to be based on historically observed frequencies – and not just because trying to do so would immediately raise the reference class problem. But subjective probabilities are bound to feature prominently in such decisions given the interactive context of foreign policy. Statistics and probability theory also help identify and correct for biases and help narrow the gap between normatively rational and heuristically driven behaviour. One can gain a valuable perspective with respect to a qualitative problem by applying the statistics and probability theory (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). This helps put the problem in a broader (unbiased) context and avoid biases.

Biases and heuristics also affect statistical judgment (Kahneman 2013). For instance, the clustering illusion leads individuals to see patterns where in fact there is randomness. The conjunction fallacy demonstrates the tendency to misunderstand probabilities. The base rate fallacy leads individuals to misjudge the probability of an event by not taking into account all relevant data. The survivorship bias (also known as Walden problem) generates a biased reference sample, as do various types of selection bias (e.g. drunkard’s search), the tendency of over-interpret data (e.g. absence of evidence is not evidence of absence), ignore sample size, possible mean reversion and/ or fall pretty to the gambler's and other well-known numerical fallacies (e.g. Simpson's paradox). Nonetheless, statistics and probability properly deployed can help correct for biases.

Acknowledging the importance of cognitive biases and heuristics as well as the epistemic challenges of using historical analogies is an important element of high-quality foreign policy decision making. Some of the 20th centuries more disastrous foreign policy decisions may well have been avoided, had decision-makers been more aware of the power of biases, the problems with heuristics and the danger of historical analogies. Maybe, just maybe Eden could have avoided the Suez disaster, the US might have cut its losses in Vietnam early on and Imperial Japan would not have provoked a war against the United States it could not win.

International politics, great power conflict & hegemonic war (2020)

The history of international relations is the history of great power conflict and intermittent hegemonic war. Conflict and war are impactful social phenomena in their own right. They also shape future international politics and determine the order of the international system. Security competition is difficult to avoid in an anarchical self-help system where states face the so-called security dilemma (Jervis 1978, Waltz 1979). Competition and insecurity among great powers is particularly acute. Even if initially a balance-of-power (or the balance-of-threat) exists, constant power shifts create a sense of uncertainty, worry and/ or opportunity among states. A shift in the relative power makes the rising state increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo, while it makes the hegemonic power more keen to preserve the status quo in light of its relative decline. Conflict and rivalry typically last for several decades until they are – often but not always – definitely resolved through great power or hegemonic war (Gilpin 1981). 

Hegemonic wars tend to involve most (or all) of the great powers of the day as well as their respective alliances. Think: Athens/ Delian League vs Sparta/ Peloponnesian League or US/ NATO vs USSR/ Warsaw Pact. The outcome of the war determines the form and shape of the international system, that is, its hierarchy (who is hegemonic/ dominant) and its structure (polarity). Following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna put an end to France’s quasi-hegemony and replaced it with the Concert of Europe (also known, incidentally, as Pentarchie in German). The end of WWI and the Versailles Treaty (temporarily, as it turned out) dismantled Germany’s semi-hegemonic position on the European continent. The US failed to underwrite the new system of collective security in the guise of the League of Nations, providing revisionist states with an opportunity to bring down the Versailles international order. WWII once more ended with the defeat of Germany’s hegemonic pretensions and led to the emergence of a bipolar system dominated by the superpowers. 

The end of the Cold War, a conflict that found resolution without resorting to hegemonic war, led to the elimination of the USSR as a superpower and the transformation of the bipolar into a unipolar US-dominated international system (Kapstein & Mastanduno 2000). With the rise of China and the revival of Russia, the international system has begun to shift away from uni-polarity towards greater multi-polarity, or perhaps even “non-polarity” (Haas 2008). This shows that hegemonic war is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for change of the international order. (The advent of nuclear weapons has perhaps made great power war too costly.) But historically such wars have been a major cause of it.

While there is some disagreement as to who initiates hegemonic war and why, it is widely agreed that a shift in the balance-of-power is a major structural cause (Organski 1958, Gilpin 1981). As Thucydides observed long ago, “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that it inspired in Sparta” that caused the (hegemonic) Peloponnesian War. The rising powers’ dissatisfaction with the established order and the hegemonic power’s defence of the status quo lead to conflict. War typically leads to the resolution (even if unilaterally imposed) of the conflict and a fundamental restructuring of the international order, or at least a major hierarchical reshuffling. When the stakes are high, as they inevitably are in a great power war, the proverbial gloves come off. This is why great powers are prepared to run inordinate risks and incur huge costs in hegemonic wars. This is why hegemonic wars tend to be prolonged affairs, involve most or all the major powers and prove extremely costly to the belligerents involved in terms of human life and treasure.

Hegemonic conflict appears unavoidable, but hegemonic war is just one way of settling a conflict, theoretically speaking. Rising powers tend to be revisionist (Allison 2017, Colaresi 2007, Thompson 1999, Lacey 2016). Their increasing power leads them to demand greater influence and a greater realisation of their interests. This clashes with the hegemonic power’s insistence that the status quo remain unchanged. Both the rising power and the status quo power tend to find it difficult to find a mutually acceptable compromise that could avert strategic rivalry. Instances of successful hegemonic retrenchment are relatively rare in great power politics (Parents & MacDonald 2018). So are, impressionistically, instances where a rising power does not demand changes to the status quo.

Why are retrenchment and restraint so rare in international politics? The declining status quo power is loath to signal weakness by retrenching for fear of reputational loss and fear of future exploitation by the challenger. Moreover, domestic hawks may find it easier to win the argument against retrenchment thanks to ideological, bureaucratic, political and diplomatic factors (Brawley 1999). Similarly, the rising power wants to see its enhanced power acknowledged in order to be able to advance its (often more extensive) interests. Doves in rising states advocating restrain find it difficult to prevail domestically. As in the case of the status quo oriented hegemonic power, a perceived lack of resolve is typically not a winning domestic-political strategy. As Thucydides suggests, “fear, honour and interest”, the impulses driving a state’s expansion, are difficult to resist. The rising state that exercises voluntary restraint is as rare as the declining state that engages in pre-emptive retrenchment. To the extent that that the either power takes actions to further their objectives, such actions are bound to be perceived as challenging the other power. This makes it even harder for doves on either side to prevail. Hegemonic conflict and rivalry are difficult to avoid. With the exception of the Cold War, hegemonic war has been the most common way to settle it.

Alliances - Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC)

The rising and declining powers tend to have different attitudes towards the status quo, including alliances, borders, conventions, laws. As the status quo largely reflect the interest of the hegemonic power, much less so of the rising power, this is not surprising. The reason why the status quo is so sensitive towards challenges to the status quo is simple. Failing to oppose and/ or penalise even a relatively minor violation of the status quo is seen as potentially encouraging the rising power to commit further violations given the benefits it derived from the infraction. A violation may also materially improve the rising power’s position, making it more costly for the status quo to challenge it further down the line. Rising powers understand this calculus. This is why they often pursue so-called salami tactics or resort to grey zone operations. It makes it more difficult for the status quo to establish whether an infraction was intentional or even whether an infraction has actually taken place. This might make it hesitant to take forceful action, not least such action may look incommensurate relative to the infraction committed. Metaphorical lines in the sand must be drawn in a way that prevents the status quo challenger from exploiting ambiguity (Iklé 1964). 

Interestingly, status quo/ hegemonic powers are very concerned about preserving the status quo in political and military terms; they seem sometimes less concerned about the economic status quo, even though military and political might is largely a function of a state’s economic power. Neither did Britain seek to slow down Imperial Germany’s ascent. Nor did, at least until recently, the US seek to stifle China’s economic rise. Perhaps economic interdependence or liberal ideology makes a policy of economic containment, at least initially, an unpalatable option (Mearsheimer 2010).

The international system is a major structural cause of hegemonic rivalry and war, and the outcome of hegemonic war, in turn, affects the international system. Intriguingly, the theory of complex systems, a subset of systems studied by general systems theorists, can also account for war; but it does so in rather different way. Amongst other things, complex systems are characterised by non-linearities and tight coupling – in addition to feedback loops, emergence and adaptation. Such systems can produce inherently unpredictable and catastrophic outcomes; they can also prove extremely resilient, adaptive, even self-organising (Page 2009). Critical transitions can lead to abrupt and dramatic state changes. Historical institutionalists may have something similar in mind when they talk about “critical junctures” (Mahoney 2000).

The international system is not a complex system per se. But the European international system on the eve of WWI looks to have been. The pre-war alliance system combined with “war by railroad timetable” (Taylor 1966) created a system that was tightly coupled, had little-to-no redundancy and exhibited significant non-linearities. In the summer of 1914, it entered a “critical” state. Complexity theory offers an intriguing explanation as to how the assassination of two individuals in Sarajevo could set off a hegemonic war that caused the death of 20 million people, the fall of ancient monarchies and the emergence of new states.

Exploring the conceptual underpinnings and historical incidence of great power rivalry helps make sense of intensifying Sino-US rivalry. China is rising. The US is in relative decline. Competition is intensifying in the military, political, economic, financial and diplomatic realm. China is keen to change the territorial status quo in its “near abroad” (East and South China Sea). The US is keen to preserve the status quo (freedom of navigation). China is seeking to gain greater influence both within the existing international governance structures, the US largely opposes it (e.g. IMF quotas). China is setting up alternative or parallel governance structure and institutions (e.g. AIIB, BRI), the US opposes it. The US seeks to draw lines in the sand (e.g. Senkaku/ Japan), China uses salami (sometimes called cabbage) tactics to soften up these lines and strengthen its position. The list goes on. Last but not least, complex systems theory highlights the importance of creating resilient systems/ relations characterised by sufficient redundancy in order to prevent uncontrollable escalation due to an accidental event.

Good analysis requires an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of conceptual frameworks and theories. It requires familiarity with and a critical attitude towards the concepts and theories themselves. It also requires an appreciation of their practical usefulness and historical-empirical validity. Concepts and theories allow the analyst to generate hypotheses about the real world. They also help to make sense of the world and/ or explain it (Jaeger 2020). Ideally, they enable the analyst to make successful predictions. Concepts and theories such as the security dilemma, balance-of-power politics, retrenchment and restraint, dove-versus-hawks domestic political competition, salami tactics and complex systems offer an interesting perspective on great power competition, hegemonic war and international order, in general, and the future of US-China relations, in particular.