The history of international relations is the history of great power conflict and intermittent hegemonic war. Conflict and war are impactful social phenomena in their own right. They also shape future international politics and determine the order of the international system. Security competition is difficult to avoid in an anarchical self-help system where states face the so-called security dilemma (Jervis 1978, Waltz 1979). Competition and insecurity among great powers is particularly acute. Even if initially a balance-of-power (or the balance-of-threat) exists, constant power shifts create a sense of uncertainty, worry and/ or opportunity among states. A shift in the relative power makes the rising state increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo, while it makes the hegemonic power more keen to preserve the status quo in light of its relative decline. Conflict and rivalry typically last for several decades until they are – often but not always – definitely resolved through great power or hegemonic war (Gilpin 1981).
Hegemonic wars tend to involve most (or all) of the great powers of the day as well as their respective alliances. Think: Athens/ Delian League vs Sparta/ Peloponnesian League or US/ NATO vs USSR/ Warsaw Pact. The outcome of the war determines the form and shape of the international system, that is, its hierarchy (who is hegemonic/ dominant) and its structure (polarity). Following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna put an end to France’s quasi-hegemony and replaced it with the Concert of Europe (also known, incidentally, as Pentarchie in German). The end of WWI and the Versailles Treaty (temporarily, as it turned out) dismantled Germany’s semi-hegemonic position on the European continent. The US failed to underwrite the new system of collective security in the guise of the League of Nations, providing revisionist states with an opportunity to bring down the Versailles international order. WWII once more ended with the defeat of Germany’s hegemonic pretensions and led to the emergence of a bipolar system dominated by the superpowers.
The end of the Cold War, a conflict that found resolution without resorting to hegemonic war, led to the elimination of the USSR as a superpower and the transformation of the bipolar into a unipolar US-dominated international system (Kapstein & Mastanduno 2000). With the rise of China and the revival of Russia, the international system has begun to shift away from uni-polarity towards greater multi-polarity, or perhaps even “non-polarity” (Haas 2008). This shows that hegemonic war is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for change of the international order. (The advent of nuclear weapons has perhaps made great power war too costly.) But historically such wars have been a major cause of it.
While there is some disagreement as to who initiates hegemonic war and why, it is widely agreed that a shift in the balance-of-power is a major structural cause (Organski 1958, Gilpin 1981). As Thucydides observed long ago, “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that it inspired in Sparta” that caused the (hegemonic) Peloponnesian War. The rising powers’ dissatisfaction with the established order and the hegemonic power’s defence of the status quo lead to conflict. War typically leads to the resolution (even if unilaterally imposed) of the conflict and a fundamental restructuring of the international order, or at least a major hierarchical reshuffling. When the stakes are high, as they inevitably are in a great power war, the proverbial gloves come off. This is why great powers are prepared to run inordinate risks and incur huge costs in hegemonic wars. This is why hegemonic wars tend to be prolonged affairs, involve most or all the major powers and prove extremely costly to the belligerents involved in terms of human life and treasure.
Hegemonic conflict appears unavoidable, but hegemonic war is just one way of settling a conflict, theoretically speaking. Rising powers tend to be revisionist (Allison 2017, Colaresi 2007, Thompson 1999, Lacey 2016). Their increasing power leads them to demand greater influence and a greater realisation of their interests. This clashes with the hegemonic power’s insistence that the status quo remain unchanged. Both the rising power and the status quo power tend to find it difficult to find a mutually acceptable compromise that could avert strategic rivalry. Instances of successful hegemonic retrenchment are relatively rare in great power politics (Parents & MacDonald 2018). So are, impressionistically, instances where a rising power does not demand changes to the status quo.
Why are retrenchment and restraint so rare in international politics? The declining status quo power is loath to signal weakness by retrenching for fear of reputational loss and fear of future exploitation by the challenger. Moreover, domestic hawks may find it easier to win the argument against retrenchment thanks to ideological, bureaucratic, political and diplomatic factors (Brawley 1999). Similarly, the rising power wants to see its enhanced power acknowledged in order to be able to advance its (often more extensive) interests. Doves in rising states advocating restrain find it difficult to prevail domestically. As in the case of the status quo oriented hegemonic power, a perceived lack of resolve is typically not a winning domestic-political strategy. As Thucydides suggests, “fear, honour and interest”, the impulses driving a state’s expansion, are difficult to resist. The rising state that exercises voluntary restraint is as rare as the declining state that engages in pre-emptive retrenchment. To the extent that that the either power takes actions to further their objectives, such actions are bound to be perceived as challenging the other power. This makes it even harder for doves on either side to prevail. Hegemonic conflict and rivalry are difficult to avoid. With the exception of the Cold War, hegemonic war has been the most common way to settle it.
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| Alliances - Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) |
The rising and declining powers tend to have different attitudes towards the status quo, including alliances, borders, conventions, laws. As the status quo largely reflect the interest of the hegemonic power, much less so of the rising power, this is not surprising. The reason why the status quo is so sensitive towards challenges to the status quo is simple. Failing to oppose and/ or penalise even a relatively minor violation of the status quo is seen as potentially encouraging the rising power to commit further violations given the benefits it derived from the infraction. A violation may also materially improve the rising power’s position, making it more costly for the status quo to challenge it further down the line. Rising powers understand this calculus. This is why they often pursue so-called salami tactics or resort to grey zone operations. It makes it more difficult for the status quo to establish whether an infraction was intentional or even whether an infraction has actually taken place. This might make it hesitant to take forceful action, not least such action may look incommensurate relative to the infraction committed. Metaphorical lines in the sand must be drawn in a way that prevents the status quo challenger from exploiting ambiguity (Iklé 1964).
Interestingly, status quo/ hegemonic powers are very concerned about preserving the status quo in political and military terms; they seem sometimes less concerned about the economic status quo, even though military and political might is largely a function of a state’s economic power. Neither did Britain seek to slow down Imperial Germany’s ascent. Nor did, at least until recently, the US seek to stifle China’s economic rise. Perhaps economic interdependence or liberal ideology makes a policy of economic containment, at least initially, an unpalatable option (Mearsheimer 2010).
The international system is a major structural cause of hegemonic rivalry and war, and the outcome of hegemonic war, in turn, affects the international system. Intriguingly, the theory of complex systems, a subset of systems studied by general systems theorists, can also account for war; but it does so in rather different way. Amongst other things, complex systems are characterised by non-linearities and tight coupling – in addition to feedback loops, emergence and adaptation. Such systems can produce inherently unpredictable and catastrophic outcomes; they can also prove extremely resilient, adaptive, even self-organising (Page 2009). Critical transitions can lead to abrupt and dramatic state changes. Historical institutionalists may have something similar in mind when they talk about “critical junctures” (Mahoney 2000).
The international system is not a complex system per se. But the European international system on the eve of WWI looks to have been. The pre-war alliance system combined with “war by railroad timetable” (Taylor 1966) created a system that was tightly coupled, had little-to-no redundancy and exhibited significant non-linearities. In the summer of 1914, it entered a “critical” state. Complexity theory offers an intriguing explanation as to how the assassination of two individuals in Sarajevo could set off a hegemonic war that caused the death of 20 million people, the fall of ancient monarchies and the emergence of new states.
Exploring the conceptual underpinnings and historical incidence of great power rivalry helps make sense of intensifying Sino-US rivalry. China is rising. The US is in relative decline. Competition is intensifying in the military, political, economic, financial and diplomatic realm. China is keen to change the territorial status quo in its “near abroad” (East and South China Sea). The US is keen to preserve the status quo (freedom of navigation). China is seeking to gain greater influence both within the existing international governance structures, the US largely opposes it (e.g. IMF quotas). China is setting up alternative or parallel governance structure and institutions (e.g. AIIB, BRI), the US opposes it. The US seeks to draw lines in the sand (e.g. Senkaku/ Japan), China uses salami (sometimes called cabbage) tactics to soften up these lines and strengthen its position. The list goes on. Last but not least, complex systems theory highlights the importance of creating resilient systems/ relations characterised by sufficient redundancy in order to prevent uncontrollable escalation due to an accidental event.
Good analysis requires an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of conceptual frameworks and theories. It requires familiarity with and a critical attitude towards the concepts and theories themselves. It also requires an appreciation of their practical usefulness and historical-empirical validity. Concepts and theories allow the analyst to generate hypotheses about the real world. They also help to make sense of the world and/ or explain it (Jaeger 2020). Ideally, they enable the analyst to make successful predictions. Concepts and theories such as the security dilemma, balance-of-power politics, retrenchment and restraint, dove-versus-hawks domestic political competition, salami tactics and complex systems offer an interesting perspective on great power competition, hegemonic war and international order, in general, and the future of US-China relations, in particular.