In The Course of German History (1945), the always enjoyable, eminently readable, if controversial AJP Taylor writes: “The Germans are the people of the north European plain, the people without a defined natural frontier (…). There is no determined geographic point for German expansion, equally none for German contraction; and, in the course of a thousand years, geographic Germany has gone out and in like a concertina. (…) Every German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent; that is the permanence of German geography”. Compared to (some) historians (Braudel 1940), IR theorists do not have much to say about geography, at least not in a systematic way. IR scholarship has not produced a general theory of how geography affects international politics. The field of International Security Studies does incorporate geography into its analyses, but it does so in a rather ad-hoc manner.
Geography played a more prominent role in debates about international politics during the latter half of the 19th and the early 20th century, especially in the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder. Mahan regarded the ‘control of the sea’ as the key to national power and geography was an important factor underpinning sea power. By contrast, MacKinder discounted the importance of sea power and argued in favour of the ‘geographical pivot of history’. Control of the ‘heartland’ allows for control of the ‘world-island (broadly: Eurasia), allows for control of the world. Nicolas Spykman and Rudolf Kjellen continued to do work in the Mahan-MacKinder tradition during the first half of the 20th century. But during the second half of the 20thcentury, such grand geo-political theorising went out of fashion in part due to its association with Nazi Germany’s programme of territorial conquest (Karl Haushofer, Friedrich Ratzel). Books and articles about geography and geopolitics continue to be written (Brzezinski 1997, Kaplan 2012), but they typically focus on case-oriented analysis (US, China) and rarely provide a broader conceptual framework for understanding how geography impacts international relations. While the theories of Mahan and Mackinder might be too ‘grand’ for today’s more policy-oriented tastes, the absence of middle-range theories of international politics that incorporate geography is noteworthy.
Geography does feature more prominently in the sub-field of security studies. The security dilemma is a function of technological, political as well as geographic factors (Jervis 1978). The military offence-defence balance is a key determinant of the severity of the security dilemma (Fearon 1997). Geographic proximity of the main belligerents, combined with a tight-knit alliance system and military deployment plans and railroad timetables, created an explosive mix in the decade prior to the outbreak of WWI (Schroeder 2004). All other things equal, geographically adjacent land powers find it more difficult to avoid military conflict, especially if the offence-defence balance is (perceived to be) tilted in favour of the former (Van Evera 1994). Rival sea powers typically face a less severe security dilemma. Naval encounters can be more easily avoided (fleet-in-being) and naval power is more difficult to project. Arguably, the consequences of a naval defeat are not as severe as defeat on land. Rivalry between two relatively distant sea powers may be easier to defuse (Schake 2017), compared to adjacent land powers. Geography may be less applicable to nuclear war fought with ICBMs or cyber war fought in the ether. Nonetheless, geography remains relevant to conventional war. Power projection over great distances remains difficult. Extended lines of communication are vulnerable to enemy interference (Biddle & Oelrich 2016). Jomini and Clausewitz would easily recognise the contemporary landscape of conventional warfare.
Geo-politics, geography and strategy are closely interconnected. Geography features more prominently in military strategy than in International Relations theory. Geopolitics is pre-occupied with the effect of geography on international politics. Geography is the study of the physical features of the earth and the atmosphere as well as of human activity to the extent that it is affected by or affects geography. Frederick Jackson Taylor’s frontier theory and Montesquieu’s meteorological climate theory are examples of how geography features prominently in other disciplines. Economists and economic historians have also produced a substantial body of work exploring how geography, climatic conditions and resource endowment affect economic development (Sachs & Warner 1995, Pomeranz 2001).
Geo-strategy is the study of how geography informs, constrains and affects foreign and defence policy. The US Naval War College defines strategy as the “process by which political purpose is translated into military action”. Strategy thus defined is closely related to operations and tactics. Geo-strategy, by comparison, is more closely related to what is called grand strategy, albeit with a more explicit focus on geography. Grand strategy can be defined as “an integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies. It is the conceptual framework that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there; it’s the theory, or logic, that guides leaders seeking security in a complex and insecure world” (Brands 2014). Geography is one of several important factors affecting a state’s interest, threats, resources and, ultimately, its policies. Again, geography does occasionally feature in the work of international relations scholars (Mearsheimer & Walt 2016). But it rarely does so in a systematic as opposed to an ad-hoc manner. In spite of a lack of middle-range theories of international politics that explicitly incorporate geography, geography matters.
Britain’s island geography was a crucial pre-condition for establishing naval supremacy and for building a vast overseas empire. Unlike its continental European neighbours, Britain did not have to invest in a large standing army to defend the realm and instead could concentrate its military spending on its navy, allowing it to both ensure its territorial integrity at relatively low cost and to expand overseas. Geography also allowed Britain to remain relatively aloof with respect to European politics (‘splendid isolation') and gave it much greater diplomatic flexibility by allowing it to act as an ‘offshore balancer’. German historiography used to refer to Prussia as Britain’s continental sword (Festlandsdegen). Palmerston memorably spoke of Britain not having eternal allies nor perpetual enemies, just perpetual interests. Diplomatic flexibility was facilitated by Britain’s island geography. Last but not least, the existence of large coal reserves helped fuel the industrial revolution that established Britain as the world’s pre-eminent economic power, which in turn allowed it to build the world’s most powerful navy and “rules the waves”.
Germany’s geographic location was a important factor affecting Prussian and later German foreign policy and military strategy. As AJP Taylor pointed out, Germany did not have fixed frontiers in the West or East and this did contribute to recurrent territorial expansion and contraction. Its geographic location also influenced its defence policy and strategy, including the ill-fated Schlieffen plan (Citino 2005). Prussia and later Germany, as relatively resource- and/ or space-constrained states, could not rely on anything resembling defence-in-depth or afford to engage in wars of attrition, not least because its geographic location often raised the spectre of a multi-front war. Military strategy from Frederick the Great to Nazi Germany reflected geographic and geopolitical reality. Voltaire described Prussia as army with a state. That can also be explained by Prussia’s exposed location. Similar to Britain, Prussia’s and later Germany’s geo-political rise was also in no small part due to the existence of ample coal deposits in Silesia and later the Ruhr.
Geography is only one factor among several that influences international politics. The multi-causal nature of important international events makes it difficult to generate a broader geographic theory of international relations. To the extent that the focus is on great power politics, scholars face a degree-of-freedom problem. Instead International Relations has been more concerned with agency and the structure of the state system (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979). But counterfactual thought experiments quickly establish geography as an important factor affecting many aspects of international politics. Britain would not have ruled the waves, had it not been for its island geography. Prussia would not have upset the European balance-of-power, had it not had access to abundant coal (and steel). Russia and the USSR would have succumbed to the Napoleonic and Hitlerite invasions, had it not benefitted from strategic depth. Neither island geography, natural resource endowment nor geographic depth on their own explain Britain’s naval supremacy, Germany’s geo-political rise or Russia’s military survival. But there is no denying that geography was a key factor in all these developments and events. Geography is a basic yet often crucial fact of international political life.
Geography affects strategy, strategic culture and strategic rivalry. Pericles, for example, advocated a “grand strategy of indirect approach” (Liddell-Hart 1967). By virtue of being a sea power, Athens was not in a position to confront Sparta on land. It let the Spartan army raid Attica every year, while the Athenians launched naval raids into Sparta’s rear areas. Unsurprisingly, British military theorists and strategists (Corbett, Liddell-Hart) generally advocated the “indirect approach” more often than their ‘land power’ counterparts in continental Europe (Jomini, Clausewitz). This is not to suggest that naval power cannot be deployed in ‘decisive encounters’ (Mahan) as opposed to using naval power in more limited and indirect ways (Corbett). But to the extent that naval powers have smaller land forces, they often have no choice but to opt for an indirect approach (e.g. Spanish peninsula/ Napoleonic Wars, British Expeditionary Force/ WWI). Geography also affects the nature of strategic rivalries (Colaresi 2008). The fact that Athens (whale) was a sea power and Sparta (elephant) a land power mattered not just in terms of how the war was conducted. It also bore on its conclusion. It was only when Sparta (with Persia’s help) successfully managed to challenge Athens at sea and destroy its hitherto dominant navy that the Peloponnesian War finally came to an end.
The major strategic conflicts and rivalries of the past century offer themselves to a broadly Mackinderian reading. At the geo-strategic level, World War I was about preventing German hegemony over the European continent. World War II was about foiling German’s second attempt to bring Europe, the western end of the Eurasian land mass, under its control as well as about preventing Japan from dominating East and South-East Asia. The Cold War was about preventing Soviet hegemony over Europe. China-US rivalry is about the US preventing China from dominating continental and maritime East Asia and South-East Asia. US foreign policy has always sought to prevent either side of the Eurasian land mass from falling under the hegemony of a single, rival state (Campbell 2016). Quote MacKinder: “Who rules the heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world”.
Geography continues to inform the US strategy towards Asia and China. The US presence in East Asia is the legacy of the Spanish-American War and WWII. So is the US hub-and-spokes alliance model (Cha 2016). The US does not have territorial claims and acts as the guarantor of the status quo. The combination of territorial non-contiguity and status quo defence leads the US to be perceived as less of a threat by regional states than China (except by China). China, on the other hand, finds its more difficult to manage threat perception. This is in part due to China’s assertive revisionism, but also because of its geographic proximity. Moreover, the US finds itself in an enviable geographic position. The US faces Canada to the North and Mexico to the South. The US navy is in firm control of all maritime approaches to North America. In fact, it controls the global commons (Posen 2003), though control is gradually being challenged by China (US Department of Defense 2019). Leaving aside vulnerability to ICBMs and cyberwarfare, the US home base is extremely secure.
By comparison, China’s geographic and geo-political position is quite vulnerable. In geographic terms, most of China’s industrial base is concentrated on the eastern seaboard. In geo-economic terms, China’s access to international markets relies on access to the seas but its seaboard faces two island chains that are largely controlled by the US and its allies. These geographic barriers can quickly be turned into geo-strategic barriers. They also hamper China’s naval deployments and may make overseas sea lane protection difficult. Moreover, China has no formal alliances. Its main partners are Cambodia, Laos and North Korea, while it shares land or maritime borders with a host of of potential or actual competitors, including Japan, South Korea, India, Russia as well as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – and further afield Australia. Most of China’s neighbours are formally or informally allied to United States and benefit from an explicit or implicit security guarantee. This leaves China with an unpalatable choice: accept its geographic vulnerability or seek to reduce it but antagonise its neighbours and the US. By building a blue water navy, China may be repeating the mistake Imperial Germany made when it began building a fleet to challenge the British navy (Luttwak 2012, Xu 2016). Geography matter greatly.
Geography also affects US and Chinese military doctrine and strategy. China has moved from coastal defence to “active defense” (or offshore waters defense) and is beginning to shift to open seas protection. This is a reflection of China’s increasing wealth and its increased dependence on international trade. Geographic and geopolitical realities shape these military strategy. The US is increasingly concerned about Chinese asymmetric capabilities, especially in the seas around China bt stretching all the way out to the second island chain. The present stand-off (island building vs freedom of navigation) is over anti-access and area-denial in the near seas. The US is also toying with other strategies, including the Air-Sea battle concepts (deterrence by punishment), offshore control (deterrence by punishment) and deterrence by denial (Torsvoll 2015) that are similarly conditioned by geography. Geography affects available military options and it is bound to affect how the US will counter China’s rise. Projecting power across the Pacific and with US military bases in the region becoming more vulnerable as Chinese military capabilities improve, the US will likely be forced to rely on strengthening its security alliances and arrangements in the region rather than increase its military assets significantly. US financial constraints point in the same direction, in spite of the Obama administration's "pivot".
Geography is not destiny, of course. Germany's geographic position did not change between 1871 and 1914, but its geopolitical position deteriorated sharply. Increasingly siding with Austria-Hungary against Russia proved a mistake. (This is not the place to analyse whether it was an avoidable mistake.) By 1914, Imperial Germany had tethered itself to weakening Austria-Hungary, had annoyed rising Russia and agonised Britain. This was not due to geography but due to geopolitical choices that might have been avoided. Present-day Germany is surrounded by economic partners and military allies. The central geographic position that previously left it geo-politically and militarily vulnerable (including during the Cold War) now provides security and economic opportunity. That said, one may make the argument that Russia's foreign policy has not changed much over the past century or so, even though the domestic political regime changed several times. Geography may not be destiny and but its effect may may outweigh domestic politics. Only because the “politics” in geo-politics matters does not mean that the “geo” does not matter. It is just that IR scholars focus more (explicitly) on the “politics” than the “geo”.
Geography does not determine international politics. Rather together with other factors it shapes the risks and opportunities states face. As such, it does affect states’ diplomatic-political options and informs states’ military strategies. Geography shaped and continues to shape international politics in enduring, if complex ways.